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Summary findings
As wvater scarcitx  and population  pressures  increase,  input  pricing,  per  area pricing,  tiered  pricing,  two-part
more  countries  are adopting  water  pricing  meclhanisms as  tariffs,  and water  niarkets.
their  priimarv means  of regulating  the  consumption  of  Theoretical  and practical  issues will become
irrigation  water.  increasingly  important  as demand  for  food  and  water
The  way to allocate  water  efficiently  is to  "get  the  increases.  Pricing water  efficiently  will help  meet  that
prices  right,"  but  how  to accomplish  this is open  to  demand,  but  what  is the best way  to make  pricing  more
debate.  Water  pricing  methods  are sensitive  to the social,  efficient?
plhysical, institutional,  and  political  setting.  To assess the  Many  argue  that  water  markets  offer  a solution,  but
costs  and benefits  of a particular  irrigation  project,  the  under  what  circumstances  are water  markets  viable?
pricing  method  must  be tailored  to local circumstances.  What  effect will decentralization  have on farm
johansson's  survey  of the resource  economics  production  and  the rest of the economy?  What  forces  are
literature  on irrigation  services and pricing  will be useful  moving  toward  decentralization  or  (re)centralization?
for developing  comprehensive  guidelines  for water  policy  The answers  to these  questions  are complex  and often
practitioners.  He  synithesizes accumulated  knowledge  site-specific.  To help  compare  them,  Johansson  lists case
about  the  implementation  and performance  of various  studies,  data  sources,  and relevant  methodologies  in the
water  pricing  methods  used  over the past  two  decades:  appendixes.
volumetric  pricing  (marginal  cost  pricing),  output  and
This paper-a  product  of the Rural Development  Department-is  part of a larger effort in the Bank to improve the efficiency
of water  use. The study  was funded by Rural Development,  Development  Research Group,  and the Bank's Research Support
Budget under the research project  'Guidelines  for Pricing Irrigation  Water Based on Efficiency, Implementation,  and Equity
Concerns."  Copies of this paper are available free from the World Bank,  1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433.  Please
contact  Melissa  Williams,  room  MC5-724,  telephone  202-458-7297.  fax  202-522-3308,  email  address
mwilliams4(@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers  are  also  posted  on  the  Web  at  www.worldbank.org/
research/workingpapers.  The author  may  be contacted  at johaO081C@tc.umn.edu.  September  2000.  (80 pages)
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper Series  disseminates  the  findings  of  wovrk in  progress  to  encourage  the  exchange  of  ideas  about
developmnent issues. An  objective  of  the series is to get thefindingsout  quickly, even if the presentations  are less than fully polished.  The
papers carr'  the  namies  of the  authors  antd should  be  cited  accordingly.  The findings,  interpretations,  and  conclusions  expressed  in this
paper  are entirely  those  of  the  authors.  They  do not  necessarily  represent  the  view  of  the  'World Bank,  its  Exectutive  Directors,  or the
cozPntises  thev represeatn
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iiiABSTRACT
In  addressing water scarcity and increased population  pressures many countries  are adopting
water-pricing  mechanisms  as  their primary  means to  regulate irrigation  water consumption.
"Getting  prices right"  is  seen  as  a  desirable  way  to  allocate  water  efficiently,  but  how  to
accomplish this remains a debatable issue.  Water pricing methods are sensitive to the physical,
social,  institutional  and  political  setting  in  each  location.  It  is  therefore  necessary,  when
assessing the costs and benefits of  a particular  irrigation project, to  cater the pricing  method
accordingly.
This paper surveys current and past views on the many aspects of irrigation services and pricing.
The result will be useful in developing a comprehensive guideline for water policy practitioners
as  they  address  the  growing  demand  f,or these  services  and  need  to  allocate  scarce  water
resources efficiently.  This survey is organized to illustrate efficient pricing methods followed by
alternatives to market failure and considerations of income distribution, water institutions and
political economies of irrigation water pricing. Existing irrigation case studies, data sources, and
methodologies are compared and referenced.
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vEXECIJTIVE  SUMMARY
As a result of the Bank's  implementation  of the  1993 Water Resource Policy, loans for
investment  in water projects often include a component  requiring  the implementation  of some
form of water pricing.  If this conditiort  is to serve a useful purpose,  water pricing should be
implemented  appropriately.  Yet, the notion of desirable  (or optimal)  water pricing  does not at all
command  consensus  among economists,  let alone policy makers. Despite the pervasiveness  of
water pricing in developed  countries,  there is still disagreement  regarding  the appropriate  means
by which to price water and the levels ol water charges. This is partly due to confusion  of basic
fundamentals,  and also because the performance  of a water pricing method is quite sensitive  to
the  prevailing conditions.  Moreover, many countries lack the  tradition, experience, and
appropriate  institutions  to price irrigation  water.  This enhances  the need for a comprehensive
study that will (a) resolve common  mis-onceptions  and myths associated  with irrigation  water
pricing, (b) define precisely the notion of efficient water pricing, account for implementation
costs, (c) define  and incorporate  equity  criteria,  and (d) put together  a guideline  for water pricing
in a wide variety of circumstances. The project,  "Guidelines  for Pricing Irrigation  Water Based
on Efficiency,  Implementation  and Equity Concerns,"  funded by the research committee  of the
World  Bank will address  this issue.
This literature  review  then serves  to provide  the necessary  foundation  of existing  nornative and
positive studies  relevant  to pricing irrigation  water as related  to this project and will be included
as a chapter  in the aforementioned  project.  In addition,  it is hoped  that the included  literature  and
discussion  will provide  a useful reference  and foundation  of relevant  pricing issues for irrigation
practitioners.
Tsur and Dinar (1995, 1997) analyzed different pricing practices vis-a-vis their efficiency
performance,  cost of implementation,  and equity  effects. Along  these lines,  this literature  survey
seeks to review and synthesize  the most relevant  and current research available  pertaining  to the
many aspects  of irrigation  water pricing. The body of literature  examining  these movements  is
vast and diverse. Most works are normative  in nature, dealing  with how water should  be priced,
with some description  of actual practicalities  and applications. A few are purely description
(e.g.,  Dinar and Subramanian,  1997). There are many compilations,  which include the literature
of a particular  aspect  of water  pricing and irrigation:
*  Conflict and Cooperation  on Trans-Boundary  Water Resources,  edited by Richard Just
and Sinaia  Netanyahu.
*  Markets  for  Water:  Potential and Performance,  edited by K. William Easter, Mark W.
Rosegrant,  and Ariel Dinar.
*  Decentralization  and Coordination  of Water  Resource  Management,  edited by Douglas
D. Parker  and Yacov  Tsur.
*  Economics of Water Resources.  From Regulation to Privatization, edited by Nicolas
Spulber  and Asghar  Sabbaghi.
*  The Economics  and Management  of Water  and Drainage  in Agriculture, edited  by Ariel
Dinar  and David  Zilberman.
viHowever, a  comprehensive review is lacking.  This  survey  seeks to  addresses this  issue by
summarizing the accumulated  knowledge regarding  the  implementation  and  performance  of
existing  water pricing  methods over  the last two  decades.  This  is confined  to the  resource
economics  literature  pertaining  to  irrigation  water,  including  external  material  only  when
particularly pertinent.
These indicate that the methods surrounding irrigation water pricing have many dimensions, both
theoretical and practical.  That these issues will become increasingly important, as future water
and food demands increase, is not in question.  Efficiently pricing water will help meet these
increasing demand, but what is the best way to increase pricing efficiency?  Many argue that
water markets offer one solution, however, under which circumstances are water markets viable?
What effect will decentralization have on farm production and the rest of the economy?  What
are the forces that  are moving towards decentralization or (re)centralization? The answers to
these questions and related methodologies are complex and often site specific.  To help contrast
these, a list of case studies and relevant methodologies are included in the appendices.
vii1.  INTRODUCTION
World water demand is  increasing in all areas of the world.  In many areas it is becoming
difficult to meet those demands due to scarce water resources.  It is evident that these pressures
will require more effective allocations anl use of existing resources. Many approaches exist that
policymakers use to allocate water, some more efficient than others.  Water pricing, whether by
administrative mandate or by market forces, is an important way to improve water allocations
and to encourage conservation.  There have been significant movements in recent years towards
decentralized methods of water pricing.  The body of literature examining these movements is
vast and diverse. There have been quite a few works including literature of particular aspects of
water pricing and irrigation, but a comprehensive review is lacking.  This survey addresses this
issue  by  summarizing  the  accumulat:ed knowledge  regarding  the  implementation  and
performance of existing water pricing methods over the last two decades'.  Due to the volumes of
related material,  I  have confined my  rzview primarily to  the resource  economics  literature
pertaining to irrigation water, including  mxternal  material only when particularly pertinent. The
goal of this survey is twofold.  The first is to provide a comprehensive literature review for the
parent project, "Guidelines for Irrigation Water Pricing."  Secondly, it is hoped that the included
literature and discussion will provide a useful reference and foundation of relevant pricing issues
for irrigation practitioners.
The survey is organized  as follows.  A. brief discussion of water scarcity and  irrigation and
related literature is outlined in section 1. Section 2 describes the prevalent pricing methods in
common use for irrigation projects in the world today.  Section 3 lays out normative theories of
water pricing.  In section 4, recent literature surrounding water institutions is reviewed.  This
includes sections on the current views cn water laws and property rights as they pertain to the
provision of irrigation water supply, waler administration (government management, water user
associations,  and  water  supplier  associations),  and  various  water  policies  ranging  from
centralized regulation to decentralized rnarkets.  Section 5 delves into the important literature
dealing  with  political  economy  concerns with  water  allocation.  A  summary  overview  is
presented in Section 6. With the parent project on water pricing guidelines in mind, the appendix
contains  a  survey  of  current  irrigation  case  studies  and  a  reference  section  on  relevant
methodologies and data sources for calcuLlating  crop-water requirements.
1.1  Water  Resources
The Earth's  renewable fresh water resources  are derived from  the  excess  evaporation from
oceans over and above precipitation to  oceans.  Calculations reveal this to  be approximately
47,000 km3/yr.  Of this about 41000 km ' are potentially exploitable 2. Of the fresh water available
' It should  be noted  that an exhaustive  literature  review  of all the relevant  articles  surrounding  irrigation  and its
pricing  is an arduous  undertaking.  In doing  so il is hoped  that salient  discussion  of the major  contributors  to this
large  body of literature  are included,  but I acknowledge  that valuable  works  may have  been  overlooked  or omitted
due to constraints  on time and access.
2 See Seckler  et al. (1998)  for a diagrammatic  display  of water balance  flows  including  global  agricultural,  domestic,
industrial,  and  environmental  consumption.
1for human consumption, we are now using between 38% and 64% (Rogers, 1993). In the long
run the amount of freshwater available to any country is nearly constant, although technological
advances can increase the percentage of the water that is economically extractable.  Recycling
and  reuse  are two  examples  of  technology  that  can  increase  total  supplies  (Asano,  1997;
Willardson, et al., 1997; Yaron, 1997b). Of course, the supply of water per capita is decreasing.
The world's population is estimated to  be 5.930 billion in  1998 and projected to  reach 8.039
billion and 9.367 billion by the years 2025 and 2050, respectively (World Resources,  1998).
Correspondingly, fresh water availability for  1998, 2025, and 2050 are estimated to be 6918,
5103 and 4380 m3 per person per  year.  These figures indicate that there  is no foreseeable
shortage in per capita availability.
Unfortunately, this fresh water is distributed very unevenly in space and time.  In 1994, twenty-
six countries had insufficient renewable water supplies within their own territories to meet most
needs of their current population. Population growth rates are relatively high in some of these
countries, particularly in Africa and the Middle East (Gleick, 1993; Postel, 1994). If we examine
some spatial water distributions in different regions we can see the disparity in per capita fresh
water distribution by continent.  Asia enjoys abundant annual fresh water per capita on averages
(above 2400 m3 per person in 2050). However, India seats at the lower end of the Asian water
distribution with 1207 m  3 per person in 2050 and, within India, the state of Tamil Nadu will have
only 490 m3 per person in 2050, a sever water shortage by any standard.  Some suggest that 1000
m3 year-l per capita is an approximate minimum necessary level for an adequate quality of life in
a moderately developed country or that 500 m 3 year 1  per capita is sufficient in semi-arid regions
with extremely sophisticated water management (e.g., Israel - Gleick, 1993).  At levels below
500 m3  year-  per  capita water availability becomes the primary constraint to  life.  This  is
therefore commonly used as the standard indicator of water scarcity (Seckler et al., 1998).  If we
examine the water situation in the Jordan River Basin we can see that for the region renewable
fresh water per capita will be halved by 2050 given current population and consumption growth
rates.  A closer look reveals critical levels of water availability occurring within the next two
decades for all countries, but Lebanon.  Similar patterns can be seen in Africa's  Maghreb and
Northeastern sub-regions.
1.2  Food Demand and Water
In addition to increasing levels of per capita demand for water consumption are water needs for
agricultural purposes.  Irrigated agriculture is practiced on  18% of the total  arable land in the
"wrld (approximately 237 million HA) and produces more than 33% of the total agricultural
production.  Of these irrigated areas, 71% are found in LDCs (60% in Asia alone).  For most of
human history irrigated lands expanded at a faster rate than did populations. However, irrigated
land coverage peaked in 1978 and has fallen off nearly 6% since then (Postel, 1994). One reason
for this trend is a  decline in public irrigation investments as a  result of debt loads, political
resistance,  rising  real  costs  of  irrigation  development,  and  declining  real  prices  for  food
(Rosegrant and Svendsen, 1993).  As an illustration, World Bank lending for irrigation projects
has fallen 50% between 1978 and 1992 (Wichelns, 1998). In addition, it has become increasingly
expensive  to  supply  irrigated  water.  Some  examples  of  increasing  costs  of  irrigation
development can be found in Rosegrant and Svendsen (1993) and Sampath (1992). In India and
2Indonesia real costs of irrigation water provision have doubled since 1970's; in the Philippines
costs have increased by more than 50%; in Sri Lanka real costs have tripled; and in Thailand
irrigated water costs have increased by 40%.  The shockingly high cost (and subsidization) of
irrigation water under the many projects found in the American West is detailed in Reisner's
Cadillac Dessert (1993).
Other reasons that may explain the decline in irrigation coverage are a 2% loss of irrigated land
each year to salinization (e.g., Israel - Yaron, 1997b), to urban sprawl, and to growing sectoral 3
competition for  scarce water.  In  Asia irrigation necessary for  Green Revolution crops will
continue  to  be  an  important  component  of  agricultural  development.  There  agriculture  is
expected to remain the dominant sector in providing employment, contributing to  GNP, and
alleviating poverty and malnutrition. Similarly for Africa, agriculture is the biggest water user.
However, only about one-third of potentially irrigated lands are under irrigation (Rosegrant and
Perez, 1997).  Populous agrarian countrtes such as India and China still use 85% of their water
supply for agricultural uses, but this can only be expected to decline as their economies shift to
industrial  output.  Industrial  water-use yields  a  much  higher value-added  factor  than  does
agriculture.  Few governments have specified how agricultural water supplies will be protected
or even legally defined (Johnson, 1997).
1.3  Future Needs
Projected global water withdrawals are expected to  increase by 35% by 2020 this will equal
5,060 km3 water (Rosegrant, Ringler, and Gerpacio, 1997). Of these developed countries will
increase usage by 22%, of which approximately 80% will be for industrial usage.  More serious
withdrawal increases will be in developing countries where withdrawals are estimated to increase
by 43%.  The likelihood of new irrigation projects sufficient to overcome increasing population,
mounting concerns over the adverse environmental-social effects of  large dam projects,  and
losses to salinization 4 is quaestionable  (Postel,  1994; Rosegrant and Svendsen, 1993; Sampath,
1992).  More likely is the modernization of existing systems to  cater to the new institutional
structures, technology, and cropping demnands  (e.g., in Pakistan - Bandaragoda, 1998).
To meet growing food and population demands it will be necessary to maintain crop yields and
output  growth,  to  increase  the  efficil ncy  of  agricultural  water  use  (including  reallocation
between different agricultural sectors), and to accommodate increasing urban and industrial use.
A logical starting place is through waler savings, improving use efficiency, and boosting crop
output per  unit of water via the reform in existing water use  policies. Seckler et al. (1998)
estimate that 50% of future demand increases (through 2025) can be met by increasing irrigation
efficiency.  Institutional  and  legal  reforms  must  empower water  users  to  make their  own
decisions regarding resource use, and provide a structure that reveals the real scarcity value of
3  In 1900  agriculture  accounted  for nearly  90% of all water  used,  by 2000  it is expected  that this decline  to about
62%  (Biswas,  1997).  When  examining  world  w  ater  use trends  over  the past  century,  it is important  to  realize  that
significant  industrial  demand  for water in many  parts of the globe  did not begin to become  realized  until after 1940.
The percentage  share  of total  water use for indtustry  in this century  is projected  to increase  from  6% to 24% (Biswas,
1997).
4 A discussion  of saline  affects  on cropping  pattems  and irrigation  and related  literature  can be found  in Plessner  and
Feinerman  (1995).
3water. In the following  sections I survey the existing methods of irrigation  water pricing and
summarize  their  main properties  vis-a-vis  achieving  an efficient  water allocation. Existing  water
pricing  methods  differ in their implementation,  the institutions  they require,  and the information
on which they are based. They also differ with regard to the efficiency  and equity  performance
of their  outcomes  and cost of implementation.
2.  IRRIGATION  WATER PRICING  IN PRACTICE
The fundamental  role of prices is to help allocate  scarce resources  among  competing  uses and
users. One way to achieve an efficient  allocation  of water is to price its consumption  correctly.
Pricing of water affects allocation  considerations  by various users.  Consequently,  a variety of
methods for pricing water have arisen, depending  on natural and economic  conditions. In this
section the prevailing pricing methods for irrigation water are described.  These include
volumetric pricing, non-volumetric  pricing methods, and market-based  methods.  Volumetric
pricing mechanisms  charge for irrigation  water based on consumption  of actual quantities  of
water.  Non-volumetric  methods charge for irrigation  water bases on a per output basis, a per
input basis, a per area basis, or based on land values.  These methods often result from
inadequate information  concerning  actual consumption quantities.  Market-based  mechanisms
have recently arisen as  a need to  address water-pricing inefficiencies  inherent in  existing
irrigation  institutions. These  rely on market  pressures  and well-defined  water rights  to determine
the irrigation  water  price.
2.1  Volumetric  Methods
Volumetric  pricing methods charge for water using a measurement  of the volume of water
consumed. This requires  information  on the volume of water used by each user or some other
way to  infer a  measurement of water consumption.  Implementation  costs associated with
volumetric  pricing are relatively high and require the central water authority  (CWA) or water
user association  to set  the price,  monitor  use, and collect  fees.
Water meters make volumetric pricing straightforward,  involving routine maintenance and
periodic  meter  readings.  When water flow is reasonably  constant,  implicit  volumetric  pricing is
possible  by charging  for time of delivery. This requires  much less information  and can be found
in  small irrigation projects with few users per day (Easter and Welsch, 1986; Small and
Carruthers, 1991;  Bandaragoda,  1998). If volume of water delivered  by the water source per
hour were to decrease  throughout  the cropping season, then the effective  price per water unit
would  be expected  to rise proportionally.  An example  of this termporal  block pricing method  is
found in the varying surface irrigation  charges  in Maharashtra,  India, where the water charge
varies  by crop and by season  (Easter  et al., 1997).
For regions with sophisticated  monitoring technology, tiered pricing (multi-rate volumetric
method) and two-part tariff pricing (volumetric  marginal cost pricing plus a fixed admission
4charge) are found.  Tiered pricing for irrigation water is common in the state of California (Rao,
1988) and Israel (Yaron, 1997b).  BolarLd  and Wittington (2000) review the recent movement
towards increasing block tariffs in developing countries.
2.2  Non-volumetric Methods
In many cases, volumetric pricing is not feasible or desirable.  In which case, non-volumetric
pricing  is utilized.  There  are several such  pricing methods found  in  common practice for
irrigation service: output pricing, input pricing, area pricing, and betterment levy pricing.  Output
pricing methods charge a water fee for each unit of output produced by the user.  This requires
knowledge of  user outputs, but  obviates the need for water use  measurement (prohibitively
expensive in many cases).  In the case vwhere  output is readily observable this method will save
in transaction costs.  Input pricing methcds charge users for water consumption through a tax on
inputs.  An example of this might be a pe  r unit charge for each kilogram of fertilizer purchased.
Area pricing is the most common method of irrigation water pricing found. Bos and Walters
(1990) in their survey of farmers on 12.2 million HA globally, found that in more than 60% of
the cases water is charged on a per unit area basis.  Under this pricing mechanism users are
charged for  water used  per  irrigated area,  often depending on  crop  choice, extent  of crop
irrigated, irrigation method,  and season.  Rates are typically  greater for pumped water from
storage than for gravity flow from stream diversion.  This method is easy to  implement and
administer and are best suited to continuous flow irrigation, which may explain its prevalence in
the irrigated world (Easter and Welsch.  1986; Easter and Tsur, 1995).  Area pricing does not
necessarily imply lack of sophistication however. For exarnple the warabandi system in Punjab,
Pakistan and Haryana, India is a relatively complex system that combines elements of volumetric
pricing with area pricing.  This rotational method for equitable allocation of irrigation water fixes
flows by day, time, and duration of supply proportional to irrigated area (Bandaragoda, 1998;
Perry and Narayanamurthy, 1998).
Betternent  levy pricing is used to captur  e the implicit value of irrigation water by charging water
fees per unit area, based on increases in land values.  This is essentially a hedonic approach to
the valuation of crop irrigation services (Young, 1996). Theoretically irrigation services should
increase economic activity in a region benefiting all those living there. Levy charges are used to
share these benefits (costs) amongst all direct beneficiaries in the service area (Easter, 1980;
Easter and Welsch, 1986b).
2.3  Market-based Methods
There are significant water resources available from water conservation and reallocation in areas
with irrigation and scarce water supply (Hearne and Easter, 1995; Vaux and Howitt, 1984; Tsur,
1997; Easter and Feder, 1998). To accomplish this it has been argued that water utilities should
charge higher prices from water (Rogers, 1992). The problem often is that users have been able
to use political power to  prevent major increases in water prices, especially irrigation water
(Easter, Dinar, and Rosegrant, 1998; T  hobani, 1998).  Water rates that may have been at one
5time accurate may be inappropriate 10 years later if they have not been adjusted for inflation
(Easter, Becker, Tsur, 1997).  One way to circumvent this drawback is to provide the correct
incentive structure to lead to efficient water markets (Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994).
It has long been recognized that markets provide a means to allocate water accordingly to is real
value, which should then lead to efficiency gains and conservation (Hearne and Easter, 1995).
Furthermore,  markets  provide  a  more  flexible  mechanism  to  allocate  water  then  are
administrative means (Marino and Kemper, 1999).  It should be noted that water markets are
distrusted  by traditional  water authorities and consequently  are underutilized  in  many areas
where they are appropriate (Wilson, 1997).  The general applicability of formal water markets in
LDCs has been questioned (Pigram, 1999). There are a number of characteristics associated with
water production and delivery that make competitive markets difficult to realize.  These market
failures include substantial externalities, recharge considerations, imprecise information, large
fixed investment costs, and declining average costs of delivery 5.
Water markets can be distinguished on the spectrum from informal to formal. At times both exist
simultaneously (Pakistan - Rinaudo et al., 1997). Water markets are often established informally
when scarcity occurs (Renfro and Sparling, 1986; Shah, 1993; Anderson and Snyder, 1997) and
when governments have failed to respond to rapidly changing water demands (Thobani, 1998).
Examples of such informal markets include: South Asia (Shah, 1991; Saleth, 1996), Pakistan
(Bandaragoda, 1998) and Mexico (Thobani,  1998).  Typically such informnal  trades consist  of
farmers  selling  surplus  ground  or  surface  water  for  a  period  of  time  (crop  season)  to  a
neighboring farrn or town.
For  formal water markets to  work there  needs to  be  buyable  and  sellable water rights.  A
transferable water permit or right is a permission to use a previously specified amount of water
and the right to sell it at a price which is determined by the market.  This is difficult if public
water agencies  are unwilling to  relinquish  their  control of  the water rights  (Howitt,  1998).
Several governments, however, have recently passed legislation to  establish tradable property
rights  for  water so that  the efficiency  gains from  informal  markets  can  be  extended  while
regulating their unrestricted nature (Marino and Kemper, 1999; Thobani, 1998; Saleth, 1998).
3.  WATER PRICING THEORY
An efficient allocation of water resources is that which maximizes the total net benefit able to be
generated  under the  existing  technologies and  available  quantities of  that  resource  (Easter,
Becker, and Tsur 1998). In other words the efficiency of water allocation can be regarded as the
equalization of marginal benefits from the use of the resource across sectors to maximize social
welfare (Dinar, Rosegrant, Meinzen-Dick, 1997).  In the absence of taxes or other distortionary
constraints, an allocation that maximizes total net benefits is calledfirst-best  or Pareto efficient.
If the maximization problem involves variable (short-run) costs only the resulting allocations can
These  factors  are discussed  in Section  4 to a larger  extent,  but are also summarized  in Easter  and Feder  (1998).
6be regarded as short-run efficient.  When long-run fixed costs are included in the maximization
problem  Pareto  efficient  allocations  are  achievable.  When  maximization  occurs  under
distortionary constraints (e.g., informational, institutional, or political) the allocation is termed
second-best efficient (Mas-Colell, Whinsion and Green, 1995; Tsur and Dinar, 1997).
Equity of water allocation is concerned with the "fairness"  of allocation across economically
disparate groups in a society or across time and may not be compatible with efficiency objectives
(Seagraves and Easter,  1983; Dinar,  Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick,  1997).  The concept  of
"fairness in allocation" is vague and can either be descriptive or normative in nature (Sen, 1973;
Tsur and Dinar, 1995).  These refer to which yardstick ones uses to measure inequality.  For
example, Sampath (1991) uses a Rawlsian concept of fairness to investigate equity in India's
irrigation systems.  This concept seeks 1o maximize the welfare of the least well off in society
and allows one to evaluate reform strateg  ies in these terms.
However, water pricing mechanism in  general are not  very effective in redistributing income
(Tsur and Dinar,  1995), but  it may be  in a  government's  national interest to  increase water
available for  certain sectors or citizens.  To  meet this  goal it is often necessary to  provide
subsidized water provision  or adopt differing pricing mechanisms that account  for disparate
income levels (Dinar, Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick, 1997). Seckler, Sampath and Raheja (1988)
admirably separate efficiency and equity into two distinct problems when evaluating an irrigation
system:  a managerial problem and a  policy problem.  They note that the performance of a
system should be judged according to  the managerial problem, i.e., does the system meet the
policy objectives.  Discussion of the appropriateness of the policy objectives is  separate and
removed, held in the context  of the broader societal environment.  In this  section, a  similar
division has been incorporated allowing for both  partial and general equilibrium discussions.
Furthermore, an outline of the water quiality  management literature on has been included as a
separate a section.  Although, the stuclies found here can be  regarded in  terms of partial or
general equilibrium, they represent a significant and growing strand of irrigation water theory.
3.1  Partial Equilibrium (PE) Analysis
PE analysis refers to analysis focusing solely on the principle agents affected by the policy under
question. For example, when examiningJ  a new irrigation project, PE would include such aspects
as the effects on farm outputs, water prices, and possible environmental effects.  It would ignore
the impacts of this project on prices of other crops, movements of productive resources in and
out  of the agricultural sector related to these changes, and possible affects on  domestic and
industrial water consumption. The follciwing  discussion concerning efficiency and equity will be
based on partial equilibrium.
3.1.1  First Best
The economically efficient allocation of water is one that results in the highest return for the
given water resource.  To achieve thlis efficiency the price of water should be equal to  the
marginal cost of supplying an additioral  unit of water plus the scarcity value of the resource.
7An important facet of the economically efficient price is that all users face the same price (Easter
et al., 1997; Howe et al., 1986)6.
There are several ways to determine this efficient price.  One is to derive the water demand and
supply curves and thereby determine the optimal allocation and price (Easter, Becker, and Tsur,
1997; Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998).  Differing methods for estimating water demand are: price
and  quantity  data  estimation  (Griffen  and  Perry,  1985) valuation  methods  (Gibbons,  1986;
Colby, 1989; Dudley and Scott, 1998), and farmland sales estimation (Colby, 1989).  Next water
supply curves reflecting increasing available supply with increasing costs need to be estimated.
These include the marginal cost of delivering and processing the water and depend on the source
from which the water is derived.  The cost of water that draws down an existing stock includes
an  intertemporal  scarcity  rent'.  Once  supply  and  demand  curves  have  been  estimated  the
optimum water allocation can be deternined.  The optimal price in this generalized enviromnent
will be that which equates aggregate supply with aggregate demand. More applied approaches to
the valuation of irrigation water can be found in Young (1996).  These include the "Change in
Net  Income" (CINI) method, the most  commonly used method to determine to determine the
shadow price of irrigation water.  This entails calculating farm income in several scenarios:  a
"with irrigation water" and a "without irrigation water".
Marginal Cost Pricing
One way to equate marginal benefits of an additional unit of irrigation water to its additional
supply cost  is via marginal cost pricing (a special case of volumetric pricing).  Marginal cost
pricing (MCP) equates price with the marginal cost of supplying the last unit of water.  In the
absence of implementation costs, the marginal cost of supply includes only delivery costs.  In
this case the allocation resulting from MCP is Pareto efficient.  However, water supply costs
include  such  things  as  the  collection  of  water  and  fees  (Small  and  Carruthers,  1991),
maintenance  (Easter,  1987),  infrastructure,  scarcity,  extraction  cost  externalities,  and  social
costs/benefits.  If supplying different users results in differentiated marginal costs, this should be
reflected  in  the  prices 8 (Tietenberg  1988; Spulber  and  Sabbaghi,  1994).  Similarly, if  water
supplied is of different quality the marginal value of supply should be reflected in the price (e.g.,
Israel - Yaron, 1997). If this is accomplished the water price will now equal the sum of marginal
delivery costs  and marginal implementation  costs (Tsur and Dinar,  1996).  For this reason,
marginal cost pricing has also been called opportunity cost pricing  (Thobani, 1998), implying
that the price of water should be set equal to the opportunity cost of providing it.
The main benefit  of MCP is that it is capable of achieving an efficient allocation.  The main
drawback  of  MCP  is  the  difficulty  in  including  all  the  marginal  costs  and  benefits  when
determining the correct price to charge.  For example, the marginal cost of water provision will
vary over months  and  over  years.  This  intertemporal aspect of  water supply is  particularly
cumbersome  (Tsur  and  Tomasi,  1991;  Sampath,  1992).  In  addition,  MCP  ignores  equity
concerns (Seagraves and Easter, 1983; Dinar, Rosegrant, and Meinzen-Dick,  1997).  In periods
of scarcity the marginal cost (price) of providing water will increase, which may adversely affect
6This  holds  when  the cost  of supplying  water  to users  is equal  across  the system. When  the marginal  cost of supply
is different  across  users, the price  they will face will differ.
7 See  Easter,  Becker,  and Tsur (1997)  for a discussion  of future demand  and uncertainty  effects on scarcity  values.
s An example  of this is found in Mendoza,  Argentina  (Marre  et al., 1998).
8lower income groups.  The implicit need tc)  volumetrically measure water use in order to employ
MCP necessitates higher implementation costs than do some other pricing mechanisms. For this
reason  and  the  difficulties  mentioned  earlier  the  effective  and  accurate  implementation  of
opportunity cost pricing has not been observed, and suggest that such pricing in practice could be
disruptive socially and politically (Thobani, 1998).
Once implementation costs are incorporated into volumetric pricing methods we enter the world
of second-best (Tsur and Dinar, 1997).  tUnder second-best conditions it can be optimal to price
water below its long-run marginal cost (Riodes  and Sampath, 1985). Consequently, there may be
other methods of pricing water that yield higher net social benefits. Sampath (1992) summarizes
the literature dealing with why many LDC's depart from marginal cost pricing.
*  There are millions benefiting from irrigation services apart from the farmers and
so the farmers should not bear the entire cost of delivery 9.
*  Pricing is dependent also on method of delivery'".  The main types of irrigation
water delivery  systems include continuous flow, rotation",  demand and closed
pipe systems.  Volumetric: pricing is feasible under the demand and closed pipe
systems, but is extremely (lifficult under the rotation system and nearly impossible
under the continuous flow system.
*  In general the closed-pipe sprinkler system are more efficient than the continuous
flow and rotation  system:,, but  are more expensive and usefulness  in irrigating
paddy crops are not yet fully known.
Water Markets
Under  certain  conditions  (no  externlities,  full  inforrnation,  complete  certainty,  perfect
competition,  and  non-increasing  returns  to  scale)  markets  will achieve  first-best allocations.
When trades are free from government constraints and high transaction costs the resulting water
allocation will be Pareto efficient and th.e resulting price will be equal to that determined under
MCP methods.  However, the question cf what to include in water transactions is a difficult one.
Such things  as  monitoring,  return  flowvs,  third-party  effects,  and  instream  uses have  to  be
considered.  Easter,  Becker and  Tsur  (1997) list  six essential  arrangements for  an  efficient,
equitable and sustainable water market.
*  Institutional arrangements that establish water rights that are separable from land
rights.
*  A management organization is needed to implement water trades.
*  A flexible infrastructure is needed to transfer quantities of water.
*  Third party effects (externalities) must be internalized by the system.
*  Water conflicts require e5fective resolution mechanisms.
9 See also  Sampath  (1983)  for welfare  analysis  on the returns  to public  irrigation  development  concerning  the issue
of who should  pay for this development.
10  For a discussion  and examples  of irrigation  systems  commonly  found  in many areas  of the world  see the book
collection  on this issue  edited  by Easter  (1986). Efficiency  comparisons  of these  systems  for a number  of case
studies  can be found  in Molden  et al. (1998).
" In Asia the rotation  system  is the most prevalent  method  of irrigation  water delivery  (UN, 1980;  Seagraves  and
Easter,  1983).
9*  Equity concerns, such as future and social goals, need to be addressed.
When these arrangements are distorted or there exist significant implementation  costs market
allocations  are  unlikely  to  attain  first-best allocations.  For example,  water  is  expensive to
transport and  therefore the development of water markets is generally localized.  Due to the
localized nature of many water markets the number of users and  suppliers is limited.  Such
situations may lead to noncompetitive markets, and preclude first-best allocations.  However,
even  when  distorted,  second-best  market  allocations  may  surpass  volumetric  pricing  in
efficiency"2.  How equitable market-based allocations are is still an open question (Bjornlund
and McKay, 1999).
3.1.2  Second Best
The pricing of water is made  difficult considering the many peculiarities  associated with the
provision  of water services' 3. For example, Kirda and Kanber  (1999) estimate that losses for
conveyance systems alone can be as high as 30% in some cases.  When including application
practices, water losses can reach 55-60% in some developing countries.  Generally, due to these
and other particularities associated with  the provision  of water the management  of irrigation
water systems is characterized by public intervention of some sort.  Easter, Becker, and Tsur
(1997) summarize some of the characteristics of water-resource development that lead to public
intervention.
*  Many water investments include large capital investments and long periods before
payoff making it difficult to attract private investors.
Often  water  supply  exhibits  increasing  returns  to  scale  and  is  prone  to
underinvestment and monopoly pricing' 4.
Many water projects incorporate aspects such as recreation,  electric power and
irrigation, which complicate the decision-making environment.
T  he Central Water Authority (CWA) often lacks complete information on water
supply, demand, and consumption, all of which can vary widely between years.
Some  water  services  are  of  public  good  nature  and  provide  benefits  up  to
congestion or degradation.
These main departures into the literature  of second-best theories of water allocation are now
discussed beginning with the public good nature of water provision.
Public Goods
Easter, Becker, and Tsui (1997) classify the provision of services using the following categories:
public  goods  (low  excludability  and  subtractability),  price  goods  (high  excludability  and
subtractability), toll goods (low subtractability and high excludability), and open-access goods
(high subtractability and low excludability).  It is useful to use these categories to describe the
12 Water  markets  typically  internalize  the cost of collecting  information.  This  eliminates  a major source  of
implementation  costs. In addition,  the corruption  incentives  associated  with  centralized  allocation  mechanisms  are
often eliminated  with  water markets.
" Spulber  and Sabbaghi  (1998)  provide  a good discussion  of the historical  development  of second-best  pricing  and
theoretical  illustrations.
14 See Spulber  and Sabbaghi  (1998)  for discussion  of natural  monopolies  and related  literature.
10type  of  irrigation service.  Goods  may migrate  from  group to  group  depending  upon the
evolution of technology or  institutions.  For example, tube-well technology  has  reduced the
economies of scale for tube-well irrigation such that it can be now viewed as a private good
category, even for relatively small-scale farmers (Vermillion, 1997).
For large-scale irrigation projects water services have low excludability because of the large
number of  farm plots and  monitoring difficulties.  In such a  situation it will be  difficult to
involve private  firms  and  market  forces  will  not  provide the  optimal level  of  investment.
Similarly the provision of goods in large portions (e.g., flood control or large dam projects) that
is  not  readily  divisible  for private  purchase  also  manifest  low  excludability.  Unregulated
markets may therefore be sub-optimal in terms of a country's social or developmental goals in
terms of poverty alleviation, food security, equity, and public health.
Water from both underground and surface sources often is an open-access good. As has been
mentioned before, there are finite amounts of water that must be  shared in common between
various sectors, regions, and their users (see also Section 3.1.2.5 Scarcity).  Over-exploitation of
these resources is commonly referred to as the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968).  This
occurs when users ignore the effects of their actions on the resource and other users when
pursuing  their  own self-interests.  To  address  this  problem economists  often advocate the
definition of private water rights and frmation  of water markets (see  also Section 4).  The
uncertain nature of water supply its political nuances can make privatization difficult, especially
if the resource is exhaustible, nonrenewable (Disgupta and Heal, 1979) or uncertain (Provencher,
1995).
Implementation Costs
Implementing a pricing method requires appropriate institutions, such as a central water agency
(CWA), and entails costs. The physical, institutional, and political environment is manifested in
the  form  of implementation costs.  Irmplementation, or transaction, costs may  render some
pricing methods impractical and narrow the list of methods from which to choose.  The effects of
these costs on welfare are both direct and indirect.  They generally make first-best allocation
pricing methods impossible by modifying optimal prices from their efficient level.  Valuing these
constraints under various pricing methods is not a trivial task and there appears to be no general
rule that one can apply in any given circumstance. Roumasset (1987) extends a public economics
approach to the examination of management costs  associated with  irrigation services.  This
extension advocates an integrated bottom-up and top-down approach to  minimize such costs.
Systems that include water permit trades should be tailored to their specific natural and economic
environrnent (Roumasset, 1987).
Beyond administrative costs, relatively easy to value, implementation costs include such things
as compliance costs, which can be quite substantial.  Due to the nature of farming systems in
many areas of the world (i.e., variance across seasons, crops, regions, and climates) complex
pricing systems that are efficient may be constrained by the informational and administrative
costs needed for implementation (Sampath, 1992; Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Barrett and
Sinclair,  1999). Tsur  and  Dinar  (1997)  found that  effects  of  implementation  costs  on  the
performance of different pricing methods are significant in the sense that small changes in costs
can change the order of optimality of ihose methods.  It is therefore possible that a simple and
11inefficient pricing method such as per area pricing, which is relatively inexpensive to implement,
yields a higher social welfare than that obtained with the potentially efficient volumetric pricing
method (Tsur and Dinar,  1995, 1997).  While these observations may be straightforward, very
little empirical evidence or methodology exists for evaluating the practical limitations of various
implementation costs
Incomplete Information
One such implementation cost is incomplete information. Whenever irrigation water is priced by
some public agency, problems related to incomplete information arise.  The user has complete
information on his/her marginal water value.  Some of this information is private and unavailable
to the CWA. For this reason  we often see literature referring to this  situation  as asymmetric
information.  This is so because rational individuals will use private information to advance their
own interests (moral hazard) or the CWA may have to spend considerable effort (in the form of
increased implementation costs) at society's  expense. Zusman (1997) uses the Ramsey-Boiteux
formula to assess the total social costs of imperfect information.  A comprehensive account, as
well as an exhaustive literature survey of regulation with asymmetric information can be found
in Laffont and Tirole (1993).  Applications to agricultural production are mainly in the context of
environmental pollution (e.g., Segerson, 1988; Russel and Shogren, 1993).
Under various conditions, regulators can circumvent the problems associated with certain types
of mechanism design.  For example, if  the CWA charges for irrigation water using per  area
pricing, it is not necessary to know users'  marginal value for water.  It is, however, possible to
infer  the  users'  marginal  value  of  water  through  various  revelation  mechanisms.  This
burgeoning  strand  of  economic  literature  (direct  revelation  mechanisms)  springs  from  the
pioneering work on informationally decentralized systems (Hurwicz,  1972) and on mechanism
design  and principal-agent theory (Hurwicz,  1973; Groves,  1973; Laffont  and  Tirole,  1987).
There are few examples  directly related to water pricing;  initial efforts include  the works of
Loehman and Dinar (1994) and Smith and Tsur (1997).
The pervasive case of unmetered water well illustrates one aspect  of incomplete  information.
Because the CWA does not have complete information on the value of the water to heterogenous
fanners  (adverse selection) there is the incentive for the farmer to  under report  actual usage
(moral hazard) if water is priced volumetrically.  Due to the high costs of implementing a meter
system often times the CWA will use per unit area pricing in these cases.  Smith and Tsur (1997)
use mechanism  design  theory  to  propose  a  water-pricing  scheme,  which  depends  only  on
observable outputs.  They find  in the absence of implementation  (transaction) costs that this
mechanism  will  achieve  first-best  allocations.  If  transaction  costs  are  included,  first-best
allocations are not possible, but second-best allocations are.  It is assumed that the CWA does
have complete information on farmer (i)'s  technology.  However, by  introducing  a  series of
nonlinear taxes on ouputs, this technology can be deduced, hence revealing directly farmer (i)'s
marginal water values. The use of this mechanism may involve prohibitive monitoring costs, i.e.,
the CWA needs to observe farm output for each farmer. Monitoring may be relatively simple, as
12in the case of Egyptian wheat marketed thiough a government marketing board, or very difficult
as in the case of a large irrigation project suipplying  many small subsistence farmers".
Externalities
There are externalities associated with water provision to the environment (pollution) or to other
interest groups (third party effects), that is. when one person's decisions do not take into account
the negative effects on others.  Economists have advocated the use of pollution taxes as a means
to  address environmental externalities (EUaumal  and  Oates,  1989). When implementing water
irrigation systems and the marketing of thLose  services often there are conflicts that arise out of
such things as return flows (third party externalities).  The potential for these depends on the
nature of the irrigation system.  One example concerns recent reluctance to engage riew large
dam projects both in LDCs and in the MI)Cs  (e.g., Sardar Sarovar Dam, India - Postel,  1999).
Third party effects of return-flow from large irrigation darn projects recently have accounted for
environmental  degradation in  Colorado.  The irrigation and  hydroelectric  projects  along the
Snake  and Columbia  Rivers  have  signiicantly  altered flow  quantity  and timing,  which  has
adversely affected salmon populations (NVillis  et al., 1998). MacDonnell et al. (1994) discuss the
third party effects of American West damns  and water banking.  They investigate three types of
third party effects: impacts on other wati-.r  users, local economic impacts on parties other than
water users, and impacts on environmental values.  rhe difficulty in managing these effects is
measurability  of  the  impacts.  A  variety  of  water  conditions,  irrigation  systems,  and  their
potential stock externalities are summarized in Easter (1999).
Scarcity
There are many ways that pricing mechanisms  can be used to address scarce water supplies.
During seasonal shortages, higher marginal cost prices should be used to ration all of the water
and to recover fixed costs during peak demand (Seagraves and Easter,  1983). Many informal
allocation systems have developed in the absence of prices or formal markets to address scarcity.
These traditional, communal arrangemerts have often operated successfully for many years, but
may not be efficient or equitable:  warabandi system in Pakistani (Easter and Welsch, 1986) and
India  (Perry  and  Narayanamurthy,  1998),  subaki  system  in  Bali  (Sutawan,  1989), and  the
entornador-entornador system in Cape Verde (Langworthy and Finan,  1996). When flows are
uncertain, shares rather than volumes of water can be allocated to individual farms.  When these
shares are tradable, efficient  allocations can be  achieved by equating marginal  values across
users (Seagraves and Easter, 1983).
Another mechanism to cover scarcity ccosts  is the introduction of a fixed charge to balance the
budget of the CWA.  In this manner the short-run efficiency of marginal cost pricing  can be
extended  (using a  two-part tariff  method) to  account  for long-run  fixed cost  considerations.
Similarly an annual Pigouvian tax can be used to manage scarcity.  This  avoids distortionary
affects of other taxing forms and is therefore capable of achieving long-run efficiency (Laffont
and  Tirole, 1993; Tsur and Dinar,  1995). Examples of endogenously determined water prices
under uncertain supply can be found in rsur (1990, 1997), Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991), and
15  Interesting  to note are the advances  in satelliti,  remote  sensing  methods  to collect irrigation  data in a cost  effective
manner. An example  for India  can be found  in Thiruvengadachari  and Sakthivadivel  (1997). These may  further
reduce costs  associated  with asymmetric  infonriation.
13Moreno  et  al.  (1999).  Intertemporal  allocations  under  scarcity  and  uncertain  supply  are
investigated in Easter, Becker, and Tsur (1997).
Uncertain supply also is related to the choice of water source and irrigation system, which will
affect the eventual water price.  Small and Rimal  (1996) using  efficiency and equity criteria
evaluated  water  scarcity  effects  on  irrigation  system  performance in  Asia.  They  note  that
optimal conveyance strategies to account for scarcity may reduce economic efficiency and equity
marginally.  Along these lines, Zilberman (1997) develops an optimal water pricing, allocation,
and conveyance system over space to capture different upstream and downstream incentives.
Returns  to Scale
Another  type  of  market  failure  exhibited by  water  provision  is  increasing  returns  to  water
production technology.  The costs for water treatment  and  delivery  per  unit declines  as  the
number of users increase.  In such cases, marginal cost pricing will not cover full costs because
the marginal cost  will always  be  lower  than the average  cost.  That large  irrigation projects
exhibit  increasing  returns  to  scale  is  well  documented  (Easter  and  Welsch,  1986a; Dinar,
Rosegrant,  and  Meinzen-Dick,  1997;  Easter,  Becker  and  Tsur,  1998).  Because  of  these
increasing returns to scaic, water supply can be viewed as a natural monopoly.  The literature
regarding the regulation of natural monopolies is well developed (Spulber and Spagghati, 1998).
3.1.3  Equity Concerns
Equity  concerns  include  such  things  as  the recovery  of  costs  from  users,  subsidized food
production, and  income  redistribution (Seagraves and Easter,  1983).  Considering effects  on
income  distribution of  water pricing has merit  of  its  own when justified  on ethical  grounds
(Rhodes and Sampath, 1988; Sampath, 1991, 1992). Moreover, such considerations often appeal
to  efficiency criteria since they tend to reduce implementation  costs (i.e., it is easier to  gain
cooperation for a policy that is fair and just).  Easter (1993) illustrates the effect of "fairness" on
efficient management of four irrigation systems (Philippines, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maharashtra,
India).  Tsur and  Dinar  (1995)  remark that  the  majority  of pricing  mechanisms  have  little
potential effect  on income  distribution  (when farmers are homogenous),  as  equity effects of
pricing are primarily dependent on land endowments.  Gill and Sampath (1992) argue with an
application to Pakistan, that despite inequality in land distribution, equality in irrigation supply
can be improved using a  lexicographic distribution  favoring small farmers.  These trade-offs
between equity and efficiency are well illustrated in Small and Rimal  (1996).  They simulate
various distribution rules on efficiency and equity for typical Asian irrigation systems.
Considerations of income distribution are occasionally used to justify  departure from efficient
allocations and it is important to understand their effects. Proponents use arguments of fairness
or social awareness  to  use redistributive  pricing policies.  They often  argue that  consumers
benefit from agricultural investments through lower food prices and so should be  expected to
share in covering the costs (Sampath, 1983). In addition equity concerns pertaining to irrigated
agriculture are important when addressing international aid and development issues.  Many argue
against water charges of any kind in LDCs, as the higher income farmers are often exempt from
paying (Easter and Welsch, 1986b).  Opponents, on the other hand, may argue that subsidized
inputs/outputs (e.g., water) distorts production decisions, inflicts domestic social (deadweight)
14costs  and  adversely  affects  international trade  (Kruger,  et  al.,  1991).  They  argue that  if
governments were to support farmers, they should find non-distortionary ways to do so.
When examining equity concerns between hetrogenous water users and sectors, pricing policies
may provide the most effective means to  redistribute income.  Sampath (1990) notes equity
concerns surrounding income redistribution via irrigation distribution have become one of the
most important objectives across disciplines' 6. Water pricing may have a role in policies aimed at
affecting income distribution between farming and non-farming sectors (Diao and Roe, 1998) as
well as between irrigation districts (Brill, Hochman and Zilberman. 1997). In addition,  equity
considerations may coincide with political interests. Just, Netanyahu, and Horowitz (1997) note
that in arid countries where water may be a limiting resource, an increasing block-rate structure
may be a valid means of trading efficiency for equity in the distribution of a scarce resource.
These considerations suggest that effects of a pricing scheme on income distribution should not
be overlooked.
The formation and functioning of water rriarkets has associated equity concerns.  These concerns
and water market development  in the American  Southwest are described in  Saliba and  Bush
(1987).  They note that higher costs associated with the purchase of water rights or distribution
based on seniority may force redistribution of water rights to different sectors or users leaving
others out of the market for water.  Some consequences of water trading and its potential for
equitable reallocation of water resources have been examined for Victoria, Australia (Bjornlund
and  McKay,  1999).  Similarly Meinzen-Dick  and  Bakker (1999)  evaluate  water  rights  and
methods for allocating water between sectors.  Therefore, it is necessary to take the other users
into account when allocating rights for irrigation water supplies.
Carruthers (1996)  in his  review of the economic  aspects of irrigation highlights  reasons for
further investment in irri yated agriculture.  One main reason was irrigation projects are at least as
successful  as  are other  development  assistance  projects  and  that  aid  for  irrigation  must  be
maintained at least at present levels.  His rationale behind this view holds for domestic irrigation
projects  as  well:  job  creation  to  reduce  migration  in  rural  areas,  development  flows  to
impoverished regions, and  the need to  focus on the  dominance of  agriculture in  many LDC
countries.  In this  vein, Carruthers et al. (1997)  make a  strong case for  increasing irrigation
investments on food security grounds.  A Zimbabwean application can be found in Shumba and
Maposa (1996).
3.2  General Equilibrium  (GE) Anailysis
GE  analysis  includes  other  regions  or  sectors  (sometimes  across  time),  where  as  partial
equilibrium analysis can be viewed as effects to a specific sector (irrigation / agricultural).  GE
analysis often refers to such things as steady-state paths, or economy-wide effects and is viewed
as being macro-level in approach.  However, to gain the big picture of economy-wide effects it
is often necessary with GE analysis to make sweeping, often unrealistic assumptions about the
prevailing economic conditions, which may in real life vary quite substantially from region to
16 In his examination of Indian farms, irrigatior, and inequality, Sampath (1990) concedes that to address inequality
it is often necessary to redistribute land.
15region.  Such assumption include those of voluntary transactions in a level playing field of
differentially  endowed  households  in a risky world, where all agents have identical, complete
information  (Binswanger  et al., 1993). The results derived from this analysis must be viewed
with these underlying  assumptions  in mind and the knowledge  that often the theoretical  results
obtained  are generalizations  of the entire  economy  and not specific  micro-level  occurrences.
In the context of water pricing, the difference  between  these two concepts is illustrated  using a
simple  example. A partial equilibrium  analysis  of the provision  of irrigation  services  would  try
to set the price such that the marginal  cost of supplying  the water equaled  the marginal  benefit  to
the farmer of receiving that water.  A general equilibrium  analysis of the same provision of
irrigation  services  would examine the effects of setting this price on other sectors such as the
urban sector or  industrial sector.  Meinzen-Dick and Bakker (1999) illustrate the need to
incorporate  other sectors in analysis when defining rights to water and choosing appropriate
irrigation  systems. Modeling (theoretically  or empirically)  additional sectors or regions is by
necessity  a difficult  undertaking,  which requires  modeling sophistication  and/or large data sets.
As a result there is not as much literature  regarding  irrigation  pricing issues.
One GE methodology  revolves around computable general equilibrium models that calibrate
equilibrium conditions using existing empirical data.  Berck, Robinson and Goldman (1991)
describe  how computable  general equilibrium  (CGE) models can be used to evaluate policies.
They summarize the contributions of general equilibrium analysis over partial equilibrium
analysis. In the calculations  of a project's direct impact  they conclude  that CGE models suffer
from the same limitations  (i.e., definitions  of costs and benefits),  as does standard cost-benefit
analysis. However, for large irrigation  projects (e.g., Aswan high dam and California Central
Valley  Project)  where  it is conceivable  that impacts  of the project will have sequential  effects  on
commodity  prices, CGE will allow estimates  of those endogenously  determined  variables. In
addition evaluations of project alternatives (e.g., fallowing of land or trade alternatives) is
facilitated  under CGE modeling. Similarly  alternative  policies outside of water policy can be
evaluated  for its contribution  to the impact  of a project (e.g.,  optimal commodity  taxes). In the
LDC environment,  prices for missing and distorted  markets (e.g., labor) can be evaluated  in the
CGE format,  which yields shadow  values for those  prices. Lastly,  the CGE format is useful for
generating  the potential  secondary  benefits (costs)  for the other sectors  in the economy.
3.2.1  First-Best
The definition of first-best allocations and Pareto optimality are  as they were for partial
equilibrium. It should  be noted, however,  that general equilibrium  expressly  incorporates  prices
for other goods and sectors and therefore  the focus is not necessarily  on determining  the Pareto
optimal  water price/allocation.  For environmental  policy,  Hurwicz  (1998)  derives  the optimality
conditions  for general equilibrium  treatments  of market failure and second  best policies.
3.2.2  Second-Best
Literature concerning second-best  GE can be categorized similarly as was partial equilibrium
analysis. Binswanger  et al. (1993) discuss how GE analysis begins with perfect markets and
perfect information  (or first best),  and as assumptions  are relaxed enters  the world of second-best
(e.g.,  credit  market  imperfections,  asymmetric  information,  moral hazard,  income risks, and rent-
seeking  distortions).  There are few empirical  GE studies examining  the environment  (Robinson
16et al., 1993; Roe and Diao, 1995, 1997; Coulder et al., 1999) or water (Diao and Roe,  1998) in
all sectors of the economy due to the scarcity of accurate data. One recent GE examination of
water pricing was conducted for industrial, domestic, and agricultural consumption in Canada
(Renzetti and Dupont, 1999).  Their simulations evaluate potential benefits and costs of a two-
part pricing policy (permits and volumetric charges) on many sectors.
Externalities
Trade  in  the  presence  of  externalities  has  been  used  to  evaluate  the  optimal  choice  of
environmental protection.  A recent exanmple  (Kohn, 1998) illustrates that under a simple Nash-
game scenario using the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin-Sarnuelson model both countries will opt for
environmental  taxes.  Similarly, the  eff-ct  of regulating  shared  water aquifers between  two
countries has been modeled  using GE theory (Roe  and Diao,  1995, 1997).  This  later study
endeavors to describe a situation found where two countries share water resources and thus the
water-use decisions of each country will affect the water availability of the other country (e.g.,
Israel, Jordan, Gaza, and the West Bank). With the introduction of the externality (country A (B)
affects the  amount of water  availability to  country B (A) depending on its  water generation
amount) they  view  the  competitive equilibrium  as  Nash equilibrium.  Contrary to  standard
Hecksher-Ohlin factor price equalization, the resulting differences in water supply and demand
between the two countries will generate different prices for water, labor and capital in countries
A and B.  The effects of various unilateral and bilateral water policies are then simulated.
Trade
Diao  and  Roe  (1995)  examine the  we',fare effects  from  liberalizing trade  in  a North-South
framework.  They  focus  on  the  environmental  effects  of  changing  trading  patterns  when
pollution enters into health consumption via a modified Stone-Geary form of utility.  This model
can be modified to expressly examine water pollution.  This model is developed in Diao and Roe
(1998), where they examine the effects of trade and water market reform in Morocco.  The crux
of this study is to determine the optimal sequence of reforms in the Moroccan economy keeping
pragmatic  political  economy  consideration  in  mind" 7. Reform,  as  such,  implies  that  the
efficiency of the existing system will be improved, however, reform is not static and must be
viewed as a process.  Diao  and Roe  (1998) do a very compelling job  of showing how  such
reform  might  be  sequenced  to  allow  for  the  losers  in  the  reform  process  to  be  partially
compensated, and thereby made to be nmore  willing to engage in the reforms.  By doing so, the
authors have made a strong empirical a]rgument  in favor of using GE analysis to examine water
pricing issues.
Vaux and Howitt (1984) developed a  G3E  approach for inter-regional water trade. They use a
spatial equilibrium approach  derived from  a  quadratic programming  model.  The Vaux  and
Howitt  model  examines  the  interregibnal  equilibrium  supply  and  demand  relationship  for
California (five demand sectors and eight supply  sectors).  They estimate that  if trade is not
allowed  and  the development  of  new  water  sources  is exclusively  used to  meet  increasing
demand the resulting prices for all regions are dramatically higher.  By allowing a market-based
17 Despite  a clear comparative  advantage  in the production  of irrigated  exportables  (fruits  and vegetables)  Morocco
continues  to protect  the wheat and industrial  crop sectors  to its collective  disadvantage.  Any water development
strategy  occurring  in this biased agricultural  system  may lead to further  inefficiencies  in water allocation  and  be
actually  welfare  decreasing.
17interregional  trade of water supplies, the increasing  demand can be met at much lower social
costs. Smith and Roumasset  (1998)  provide an extension  of the spatial/intertemporal  model for
water management  with multiple sources and transport technologies  to the Waihole-Waikane
aqueduct  in Hawaii.
Endogenous  Growth
Recent endogenous  growth literature should be mentioned  here.  These models are related to
general equilibrium approaches in  that  they  examine  several  sectors  of  the  economy
simultaneously" 8. There have been several recent articles examining  optimal growth strategies
for countries accounting  for environmental  quality.  These can be adapted for specific water
sectors if need be. Elbasha and Roe (1995a)  incorporate  pollution and abatement  efforts into an
R&D endogenous  growth  model. They determine  that the effect of the environment  on growth
depends on the intertemporal  substitution  of consumption  elasticity.  Elbasha and Roe (1995b)
further develop three types of  endogenous growth models (convex models, human capital
models,  and  innovation models)  to  include  environmental consumption and  pollution
externalities. Mohtadi  (1  996) and Bovenberg  and de Mooij  (1997)  show  how the optimal  growth
path for a country  depends upon the type and extent of environmental  regulation. Aghion and
Howitt (1998)  in their comprehensive  text on endogenous  growth  theory include  several  relevant
sections to  our  survey:  steady-state existence with  environmental pollution  and  with
nonrenewable  natural  resources.
Scarcity
Rausser  and Zusman (1991)  explore the affects  of water scarcity  on the political  power balance
in a general equilibrium  format. Sectors  included in the analysis consist of n districts,  a CWA
and a government,  yielding an n+2 game determining water allocations.  Alternative  supply
reduction  strategies  for environmental  improvement  are examined  in a multi-dimensional  format
in  Sunding et al.  (1994).  This paper incorporates 3  specific models for Central Valley
agriculture  to provide a holistic view of environmental  protection  policies  affecting California's
Bay/Delta region.  These models' 9 reveal that increasing water costs (reduction in irrigation
diversions)  and labor  distortions  due to environmental  legislation  can be mitigated  through  water
trading.
Equity Concerns
Nearly  any general equilibrium  analysis  will revolve  around equity  issues, including  such things
as income  distributions. The basis of GE analysis  is to discover  the repercussions  of an action in
one sector in one country  in  other sectors of that economy  or other countries. Estimating who
wins and who loses and by how much is the typical output from GE analysis.  For this reason
many of the aforementioned  literature will also appear in section 8, dealing with the political
economy  of water allocation. For examnple,  Just, Netanyahu,  and Horowitz (1997) examine the
equity  considerations  of water  pricing in a quasi-general  equilibrium  fashion.
The use of the IMPACT  model  for IFPRI's 2020 Vision  research  program enables  researchers  to
generate various scenarios  regarding equity concerns as a function of global food supply and
' 8Diao et al. (1996) link endogenous  growth  models  and the general  equilibrium  literature.
'9 These  are: California  Agriculture  Resources  Management  (CARM)  model,  and an agronomic  model  with
technical  substitution,  and a water-rationing  model.
18demand linked by trade in a general equilibrium framework (Carruthers et al., 1997).  As one of
the underlying parameters for IMPACT is irrigation investment, the effects on food security of
changing investment levels can be evaluat-d  for a variety of regions and periods (Rosegrant et
al., 1995).
3.3  Water Quality Management
The  question of  environmental  regulation  and  degradation  has  received  enormous  attention
recently.  Biswas (1997) provides a review of water development and effects on the environment.
These effects include erosion, sedimentation, waterlogging, salinity, eutrophication, and various
mechanisms to deal with these problems (Dinar and Zilberman, 1991; Biswas, 1997). Similarly,
Gleick (1993) reviews current water uses amd  environmental consequences for the future.  Some
pertinent issues included are: water quality problems, water quality  management,  irrigation's
environmental price, scarcity and competilion, etc.  To address the literature concerning all these
issues would be prohibitive.  Instead several areas concerning water pricing for agriculture will
be reviewed.
3.3.1  Pollution
There are two issues that  are particularly  important to  consider when  considering permits or
prices (taxes) to  deal with  water-quality problems. These  are:  (1)  the nonunifornity  in the
impacts of water use, and  (2) nonpoint-source pollution (Easter et al.,  1997). Nonuniformity
refers to spatial and temporal variation in impact that different emitters of pollution will have on
the water resource.  Nonpoint-source  pollution  is  that  where the  source  of the  pollution  is
typically unknown.  Anderson and Snyder (1997b) trace the developments in water pollution
regulation in the US from a command-and-control (CAC) framework to recent developments in
market approaches.  The latter include systems  of taxes and tradable permits to  provide the
correct incentive structure so that polluters incorporate the net social damages into their decision
function.
To achieve an efficient system of taxes or permits to address the problem of nonuniformity, it is
necessary  to  account  for  the  varying  impacts  of the  emitters on  the  water  resource.  The
optimality of determining these impacts umder  asymmetric information versus flat rate taxes is a
frequently examined question.  Goulder et al. (1999) evaluate cost-effectiveness of alternative
environmental regulation using general equilibrium simulation models.  Kim et al. (1999) find
that regulatory instruments chosen endogenously show greater gains to constant-rate taxes than
to targeted pollution taxes. Similarly wilh nonpoint-source pollution there is again a problem of
not having the necessary information to correctly price water resources or penalize polluters of
that resource.  Segerson (1988) examines regulation of nonpoint polluters in a small watershed.
She addresses the issue using a commar d-and-control penalty that provides the incentive for all
farmers in the watershed to self-regulate their outputs.  Extensions to this are recent game theory
studies of environmental regulation (e.g. nonpoint nitrate leaching - Bhat, et al.,  1998).  The
development of tradable pollution righis is traced  in Maloney and  Yandle (1983) and is well
documented for point source pollution (Montgomery, 1972; Baumol and Oates, 1989).
19Trading systems for these rights have been adapted for rivers (O'Neil  et al., 1983), for sulfur-
dioxide emissions (as in the Clean Air Act of 1990), for greenhouse gas emissions (Leiby and
Rubin, 1998), and for futures markets (Laffont and Tirole, 1996a). Recent attempts at regulating
nonpoint sources using permit trading and optimal taxes include a theoretical model accounting
for  both  spatial  and  temporal  variance  of pollution  impacts  (Kim  et  al.,  1997;  Goetz  and
Zilberman,  1998) and  empirically for nutrient reductions  in agriculture:  for nitrate leeching
(Fleming and Adams, 1997; Morgan, 1999) and for eutrophication (Heidiger, 1999; Johansson,
1999;  Westra,  1999). Market  extensions  for  tradable  pollution  permits  include  futures  and
options  markets.  Laffont  and  Tirole  (1996a)  examine  such  markets  under  asymmetric
information and deternine  optimal abatement and compliance strategies.  They note that stand-
alone spot markets will induce excessive abatement.
3.3.2  Conservation
It is fairly obvious that in dry regions with  scarce water resources, the competition  for water
between different sectors will intensify.  It will become even more important to enforce effective
use and water conservation.  Due to increases in non-agricultural demand, it is estimated that by
2025 the supply-demand gap in Tamil Nadu (a water-poor state in India) will be approximately
44.72% (Palanisami,  1999).  Examples of conservation  and water management  techniques  to
increase potential water are numerous.  They include: adoption of alternative cropping systems
with  less  dependence  on  irrigation,  improvement  of  existing  irrigation  systems  (e.g.,
participatory  including  water  users),  salt  water  utilization  for  growing  crops,  waste  water
utilization for agriculture, and adoption of new irrigation technologies (Kirda and Kanber, 1999;
Palanisami, 1999).
There have been several recent economic reviews of the management for groundwater systems
(Gisser, 1983; Tsur and Zemel,  1995; Zilberman, 1997) and for conjunctive management with
surface water (Tsur, 1990; Boggess et al., 1993; Zilbernan,  1997).  These indicate a variety of
pumping and storage strategies to  stabilize supply.  For example, Gisser (1983) introduces a
system  of transferable  permits  for pumping  rights  to  prevent  over-pumping  of  groundwater
aquifers.  However,  increasing  use  and  stochastic  weather  shocks  will continue  to  demand
conservation efforts.  As water becomes more expensive, water conservation will be encouraged.
In addition water markets are increasingly being used for environmental restoration (Willis et al.,
1998).  Water  trading  between  regions  can  mitigate  these  increased  water  costs  due  to
environmental protection efforts (Sunding et al.,  1994).  For example, Central Valley Project
farmers in California now pay restoration surcharges to fund environmental restoration (Green
and  Sunding,  1997).  It  should  be  noted  that  not  all  water  trades  from  agriculture  to  the
environment might be efficient as many assume (Ise and Sunding, 1997) due to market failure
(such as imperfect credit markets).
The  effects  of  pricing  policies  on  water  quality  often manifest  through  choice  of  farming
(irrigation) technology.  When pricing reflects increased  scarcity of water resources  over time
resource-augmenting  irrigation  technology  should  result.  At  times  the  government  may
explicitly encourage water-saving technology adoption (Wichelns et al, 1996) to improve water
quality.  Zilberman et al. (1992) confirm that farmers'  response to irrigation supply reductions
can  be  predicted  by  economic  theory  (i.e.  increasing  groundwater  pumping,  adopting
conservation technologies, and fallowing land), but that the timing of the responses are difficult
20to estimate.  Varela-Ortega et al. (1998) also show that farmer responses are strongly dependent
on the institutional framework (e.g., credit system) involved, which may mitigate the adoption of
conservation technology attributed to pricirLg.
The adoption of and economics of conservation-technology in irrigation has been reviewed and
developed  for water price  and  land quality  (Caswell and  Zilberman,  1985, 1986);  for asset
quality (Caswell, Lichtenberg, and Zilberraan, 1990); for variable resource qualities (Dinar and
Yaron, 1990); Dinar and Zilberman,  1991; Caswell, Zilberman, and Casterline, 1993); for land
allocation  (Green  and  Sunding,  1997);  and  for  underinvestment  due  to  subsidized  water
(Zilberman et al, 1997) or due to asymmetric information and tradable permit markets (Laffont
and Tirole,  1996b).  For example, Caswell et al. (1990) discuss the effects of envirommental
regulation (such as a drainage effluent fee', on the adoption of irrigation technologies.  They find
that  such  economic  considerations  may  encourage  the  adoption  of  water-conserving
technologies. Shah et al. (1995) find that it:  may be optimal to increase water prices to encourage
more quickly the adoption of water conserving technologies such as drip-irrigation used with
ground water  (i.e. exhaustible resource).  This  will also  retard  excessive resource  depletion
caused by open access, market failure.
4.  WATER INSTITUTIONS
There is a renewed interest regarding the evolution  of economic institutions for managing natural
resources (Ostrom, 1990; Easter and Tsvr, 1993; Ostrom, Gardner and Walker,  1994; Merrey,
1996; and Saleth and Dinar,  1998).  The term "water  institution"  broadly refers to  the legal
institutions of water distribution (water law and water rights systems), to water management and
allocation institutions or water administration (as defined by water laws and water rights), and
water policies  (the practical  implementation of  water laws by  water administration).  These
interrelated dimensions of water institutions characterize the water sector.  Along these lines this
section will discuss the various water inslitutions in turn.  Important considerations derived from
the inherent water institutions in place or from the changes occurring in these institutions (as in
the  case  with  the  movement  to  decensralized water  policies)  are  regarded  as  the  political
economy of water institutions and are dismussed  in Section 5.
4.1  Legal Institutions
The laws and rules that define water distribution will naturally affect the performance of the
system (e.g., Asia - Small and Rimal, 1996; Spain - Garrido, 1997; Tamil Nadu - Brewer et al.,
1997).  The  evolution  of  water  law  and  property  rights  is  intrinsically  linked  to  political
economies and  changing climate of water regulation.  It is therefore, difficult to  separate out
specific water  laws  that  are  applicabl:  to  the  variety  of  global  irrigation  systems.  I  have
provided several references that review water law and continue with a discussion of water rights.
How well water rights are defined in a country will reflect its degree of decentralization in water
regulation and the appropriateness of water markets to price irrigation water.
214.1.1  Water Law
It is important to integrate conscience design of institutional rules and economic incentives (e.g.,
water laws and property rights) to address social concerns of efficiency, equity and externalities.
Anderson (1983) provides an extensive discussion of the roots and developments in water law
and property rights for the American West.  Several specific cases from the 19* Century and
their importance in determining current practices  can be  found in Kanawa  (2000). A similar
discussion of international water law and literature can be found in McCaffrey (1993). Dinar and
Loehman (1993) address the use of water law to resolve water provision problems (quality and
quantity).  Included are case studies and  applications to  current water issues (e.g., Colorado,
California, Taiwan, India, Ontario, and Australia).
Unclear definitions and uncertainties in water laws are cited as the limiting factor regarding the
sustainability  and  efficiency of  irrigation system management.  Brewer  et al.  (1997) review
studies linking system performance to water rules.  They separate these studies into four areas:
those that use simulation models to investigate optimal distribution rules (e.g.,  Anderson and
Maass, 1987; Chaudhry and Young, 1990; Howe, 1990; Kelley and Johnson,  1990; Small and
Rimal, 1996); those that evaluate distribution performance for particular irrigation systems (e.g.,
the warabandi system  in Haryana - Malhotra,  1982; Bandaragoda,  1998); those  that  discuss
whether distribution rules are followed (e.g., Wade, 1988; Vermillion, 1991); and those that treat
irrigation management as an open-access resource (e.g., Ostrom, 1992). They detail these effects
for the Tambraparani Irrigation System (India) and note resulting inefficient performance and
inequitable  water  distributions.  Similar  deficiencies  have  been  noted  in  recent  legislation
accompanying the movement towards decentralized water regulation in Mexico (Johnson, 1997).
Spulber  and  Sabbaghi  (1998)  review  water  regulations  and  compatibility  with  recent
privatization efforts.
4.1.2  Water Rights
For the free market to determine fully the development and allocation of irrigation water, there
would have to be a system of pure private property rights. Property rights based  on long-term
contracts  may also  be  sufficient  for  efficient  markets.  Anderson,  Burt  and  Tractor  (1983)
contend that the key to market allocation of groundwater is a well-defined, enforceable system of
transferable property rights.  The existence of this  type of  system necessitates:  (1) certainty
(specific definition of th* right including such aspects as quantity, quality, location, and time of
use);  (2)  transferability  (ease of  right  transference via  purchase  and  sale);  (3)  absence  of
externalities; and (4) existence of market competition in both the demand and supply sides of the
market.  In the absence  of such rights,  government  intervention will  be  required to  enforce
private rights or to allocate scarce water resources using another mechanism 20.
Once markets begin to informally facilitate the transfer of water among users it is necessary to
determine how water rights will be defined.  Rights for water use have evolved through custom
or bodies of law  and regulation in most  countries. Zilberman et al. (1997) trace the transition
from water rights to water markets.  The Western notion of privately defined property rights has
20 Several authors have addressed  the effects of ill-defined  or enforced  property rights (Hunt, 1990; Ghosh and
Lahiri, 1992;  Tang, 1994; Anderson  and Synder, 1997), of uncertain  property rights (Feder and Noronha, 1987;
Feder  and Feeny,  1991),  and of open-access  water resource  management  (Easter,  Becker,  and Tsur, 1997).
22evolved over the centuries  combining eccnomic, and political changes (North,  1981).  Water
rights specify how water will be divided between sectors (industrial, domestic, and agricultural
consumption) and also within sectors, as nmight  be the case between individual farmers (Holden
and Thobani, 1996).  In most countries water rights are based on one of three current systems
(Sampath,  1992; Holden  and Thobani,  1996): riparian rights link ownership to  adjacent land
ownership 21, public allocation based on piorities  of use determined by  government, and prior
allocation determined by actual historical l.se.
The  limitations  of  prior  allocation  and  riparian  rights  and  the  movement  towards  state
administration of water rights are descriled  in Anderson and Snyder (1997b).  Rights can be
defined in terms of a share of streamflow, aquifer, or reservoir. These can be in actual quantity
terms or for given time periods.  When  rights are defined by quantity there  are two methods
typically  used  to  address  scarcity:  by  priority  basis  (e.g.,  senior  water-rights  holders  in
California) or a proportional  division based on expected shortages  (Easter, Becker, and  Tsur,
1997).  Anderson, Burt,  and  Fractor  (1983)  trace  the  evolution  of  groundwater rights  and
describe the similarities to surface water r  ights. As noted in Kanawa (2000), by clearly defining
water property rights  in the  courts, legal  uncertainty  for market  applications will result also
reducing the amount of litigation.
Studies that examine water rights generally extend their  analysis to  the corresponding water
markets associated with those systems.  The movement from water rights to water markets is not
always optimal, but depends on the asseciated political and economic costs (Saliba and Bush,
1987; Shah and Zilberman, 1995).  As in the case of Mexico, there is often considerable tension
between market transferability and highly regulated trading. Rosegrant and Schleyer (1996) note
several trends that will continue to encourage the transition from water law and rights to market
trades  in  Mexico, which  are  also applicable  to  other countries:  continuing  macroeconomic
reform will require  further market  development at  the micro  level,  growing  nonagricultural
demand will push for increasingly open water markets, farmers will continue to lobby for easily
transferable  water  rights,  and  as  mentioned  the  general  climate  of  decentralization  favors
continued development of water markets,
Many of the same market and regulatory failures that are found with water provision in general
are also relevant when defining water tights.  Gisser and Johnson  (1983) develop a model to
explain water rights and externalities.  Ihey  conclude that efficiency requires the transferability
of these rights when well defined to account for third-party effects.  Empirical  extensions are
provided for  the  Middle Rio  Grande  Conservancy  District.  The  open-access  problem  with
respect  to  instream  water rights  is examined  for  several western  states  in  Huffman  (1983).
Tregarthen (1983) discusses how the informational and transaction costs associated with water
right transfers in Colorado can generate perverse conservancy incentives.  These incentives are
difficult to legislate against due to public distrust of purely private markets.  Anderson, Burt, and
Fractor  (1983)  discuss  groundwater  rights  and  apply  their  model  of  optimal  groundwater
extraction to privatization efforts in the Tehachapi Basin, California.
21 This system is generally found with abundant water (e.g., France and Eastern, USA).
234.2  Water  Administration
The primary role  of  a  water  administration  is  to  facilitate  irrigation water  management  by
reducing implementation costs and to promote an efficient, equitable, and sustainable allocation
of water resources.  The type of administration  ranges from  governmental water agencies to
water user and supplier associations.  This component of the water sector includes the following
administration-related  institutional  aspects:  spatial  organization,  organization  features,
functional  capacity,  pricing  and  finance,  regulatory  and  accountability  mechanisms,  and
information, research and technological capabilities (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). Roumasset (1988)
outlines necessary incentive-compatible relationships between the different units in an irrigation
system (manager, supplier, and user) to insure sustainable irrigation service provision.
The prevailing water administration  and the performance of the different pricing  methods are
intrinsically related.  What ties these two together is the task of implementation.  Hurwicz (1998)
examines institutional arrangements and the theory of implementation as applied to correcting
market  failure.  Differeni  institutional  arrangements are  more  conducive  to  certain  pricing
methods and less so to others' 2 . For example, volumetric pricing is inappropriate in a riparian
system requiring metered water facilities.  The existence or lack of water user associations of
different forms bears important implications  for information asymmetries and  for the cost  of
extracting water fees.  Where  water rights  (permits  or  entitlements) exist, the  feasibility  of
trading  them requires well-defined trading rules  and appropriate institutions  to  enforce these
rules  and resolve conflicts as they arise.  Moreover,  as a society matures its  socio-economic
objectives and its institutional framework is subject to pressures. A nation's  ability to cope with
these pressures directly affects the management of its  natural resources.  This  ability to cope
gains increased importance as the quantity of uncommitted resources  diminishes (Frederiksen,
1997). This section will provide a summary background of the evolution of water institutions in
the  context  of  irrigation  beginning with  centralized government  control  and  following  with
decentralized supplier and user organizations.
4.2.1  Government Institutions
Livingstone (1998) notes that water organizations have had a pervasive role in the allocation of
water. Historically, governments have provided defacto subsidies to the agricultural sector by not
fully recovering capital costs and achieving partial recovery of O&M costs (Wichelns,  1998).
Anderson and Snyder (1  997b) trace the evolution of water administration in the US from the 17k"
Century to modem timesF.  They note that well-defined, exclusive land and water rights provided
the necessary tenure security to stimulate private irrigation investments. For a background on the
evolution  of government  control  of  water resources  see  Fredriksen  (1997) and  Spulber  and
Sabbaghi (1998).
Reform efforts targeted at the government provision of irrigation water services have been hinted
at in earlier sections, are largely due to the realization of government failures.  Easter and Feder
(1998) note that these failures are more pronounced in LDCs, but are also apparent in developed
economies. These include, misallocated project investments, overextended government agencies,
22 See Water Policy Section: .
24inadequate  service  delivery  to the poor, neglect  of water quality and environmental  concerns,  and
the underpricing  of water resources.
That is not to say there are not examples  of relatively efficient  government  water organizations
that have adequately  addressed the market failures associated  with irrigation water provision.
These include  the management  of the Mahaweli  in Sri Lanka  and the Bhakhra  Beas Management
Board, India (Livingstone,  1998). Both include basin-wide  management  strategies  to evaluate
the impacts of policies on most users.  Characteristics  distinguishing  water organizations  that
encourage  efficient  water use are: unbiased allocation,  providing  water brokerage  to lower  trade
transaction  costs, floating  water price, and enforcement  of third party rights. Livingstone  (1998)
provides a good discussion of these requirements. Easter (1993) illustrates how four essential
characteristics  of government  manageme  nt can affect  the efficiency  of irrigation  services. These
include assurances that water fees will be used for O&M (both of other farmers and of
government  agencies),  commitment  to l fficient water allocation,  and fairness of setting water
fees.
Government involvement in  the  allocation of  water resources has  increasingly become
decentralized in  recent years (Parker and Tsur,  1997; Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998).  For
example,  recent reform  in Pakistan  aimed at increasing  irrigation  water use efficiency  is based on
shifting strategic  decision-making  responsibilities  to decentralized  public  utilities and water user
associations  (WUAs). These reforms would facilitate greater use of market mechanisms and
greater role for the private sector in fann capital investments. However,  in the development  of
water markets,  the government  is responsible  for creating  a supportive  institutional  environment.
As mentioned  earlier,  water markets canl  achieve first-best  allocations,  but to be successful  they
require several components from the local, regional, or national government.  Government
intervention  is often necessary  to define and enforce water rights in order for the successful
functioning  of water markets. GovernmLents  assist in monitoring  and regulating  externalities  and
third-party  effects  of irrigation  (Meinzen-Dick,  1997).
4.2.2  Water  Supply  Organizations
Although faced with limited physical, financial, and ecological  resources to  potential water
supplies, countries  try their best to sel;  the right institutional  foundation of their water sector.
These efforts are reflected  in terms of legal and policy reforms  and administrative  reorientation.
Water supply reform is mainly due to three reasons (Vermillion, 1997):  (1) CWAs lack
incentives and responsiveness  to  optimize management  performance - farmers have direct
interests in enhancing  system quality, efficiency,  and sustainability; (2) management  transfers
coupled  with supportive  social and technical support  will result in improved system  quality and
efficiency;  and (3) management  transfer will save the government  money in terms of reduced
O&M  responsibilities.
While reform efforts differ across countries  in terms of actual coverage and effectiveness,  the
currently  observed  water sector  institulional  changes  at the international  level are remarkable  for
their commonality  of focus and dire':tion.  These include a shift from source development
(supply management)  to allocation  (demand  management),  wide acceptance  of privatization  and
the decentralization of control, adoptiDn of integrated approaches to  sector-wide management,
and an increased  focus on economic  viability and physical sustainability. The first of these, the
25paradigmatic  shift from  water development to water  allocation, cannot  be affected overnight
(e.g., in Turkey - Bilen, 1995; Svendsen and Nott,  1997).  Fundamental changes are needed to
reorient all the water institution components.  While it is easier to have allocation-oriented water
laws and policies, it is difficult to build an allocation-oriented organizational structure needed to
translate the legislative provisions out  of an organization with  an  entrenched experience and
tradition in water development.  Realignment of existing water administration with new skills
and  information  along  with  the  creation  of  additional  inter-sectoral  and  inter-regional
organizations  are  critical  to  face  the  challenges  of  an  allocation  paradigm.  Unlike  the
development  era  characterized  by  bureaucracy  and  dominated  by  political  and  engineering
considerations, the allocation  era requires open  and participatory  decision processes with  the
primacy of economic and ecological information.
Countries have begun  to recognize the functional distinction between  centralized mechanisms
needed  for  coordination  and  enforcement  and  decentralized  mechanisms  needed  for  user
participation and  decision-making (Winchelns,  1998; Vermillion,  1997). Often  these reforms
face much bureaucratic resistance  (Wilson,  1997).  Some examples of recent reform include:
Uzbekistan  (Djalalov,  1998);  Turkey  (Bilen,  1995;  Sevendsen  and  Nott,  1997);  Mexico
(Rosegrant  and  Schleyer,  1996;  Johnson,  1997); New  Zealand  (Farley  and  Simon,  1996);
Vietnam (Small, 1996); and Australia (Pigram, 1999).
The key  features of this  ongoing  decentralization are river basin  organizations, privatization
programs in the irrigation sub-sector, and utility agencies in the urban water sub-sector. Many
countries  have realized  the importance  of  basin  level  organizations  both  as  a  planning  and
operational  mechanism.  Although  they  are  called  differently  in  different  countries  with
considerable variation in their organizational structures, they have a common conceptual basis.
Such  organizations,  designed  primarily  on  hydro-geological  rather  than  administrative
boundaries, could provide the basis for pursuing an integrated approach to water management
and for resolving regional and sectoral conflicts. Recent reviews of the basin-wide approach to
reform with case studies can be found in Vermillion (1997) and Easter (1999).
4.2.3  Water User Organizations
These  farmer-managed  associations, better  known  as Water  User Associations  (WUAs),  are
examples  of  organizations  that  allocate  the  water  shared  by  a  group  of  farmers.  These
organizations are responsible  for a  wide  range of  management  activities.  Some  have more
responsibilities than  others  (Martin  and  Yoder,  1987).  For example,  Meinzen-Dick  (1997)
identifies two broad categories of WUAs: the Asian model and the Americas Model.  The Asian
model  incorporates  farmers in  smaller  organization  units  allowing  direct participation  of  all
farmers based on social boundaries.  The American model relies on specialized, formal irrigation
organizations based on hydraulic boundaries.  The Americas model contains specific provisions
regarding farmers'  water rights (e.g., Columbia Basin and Mexico), whereas the Asian model
focuses do a greater degree on the formation of social capital.
Since WUAs are managed by and operated with the interests of water users in mind, they tend to
substantially  reduce  the  costs  of  implementing  water  pricing,  such  as  monitoring  and
enforcement costs (Easter and Welsch,  1986b; Wade,  1987; Zilberman,  1997).  For example,
volumetric wholesaling is the practice by which the CWA sells water to a WUA at some point in
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degree of efficiency in the collection of water costs by the WUA (Small,  1989; Meinzen-Dick
and Rosegrant, 1997). This type of distritution would require strong leadership and organization
of the WUA to be responsible for delivering water in the branch canal(s) and collecting fees from
each user (Easter and Welsch, 1986b).  WUAs can also provide important brokering services for
water trades as found in water transfers in the western U.S. (Cummings and Nercissiantz, 1989).
Many factors affect the viability of WUA'; property rights are a crucial factor9 3. The creation and
ownership of irrigation property (water, conveyance structures, and pumping equipment) form
the basis for relationships among the irri.gators, which form the, "... social basis for collective
action by irrigators in performing various irrigation tasks," (Coward, 1986).  Well-defined water
rights  give farmers incentives to participate in the  operation and  maintenance of their water
supply system.  These rights  can be  assigned to individuals or to  groups of farmers, such  as
WUAs  (Wade,  1987; Feder  and Noronha,  1987). The individuals  or  associations will  have
economic incentives to  maximize net benefits generated by their activities (Winchelns,  1998),
which include both increasing supply efficiency and rroduction  efficiency (Kloezen et al., 1997).
For  example, public  irrigation  in  Mexico  has  undergone  substantial  decentralization.  The
resulting  transfer  of  control  to  WlAs  has  resulted  in  increased  O&M  fee  collection  and
provision of irrigation services (Mexico - Johnson, 1997; Pakistan - Svendsen and Nott,  1997).
This property-induced cohesion is important in many aspects of water management, but  it is
especially critical for water allocation.  Another example concerns small-scale irrigation and its
link to  land tenure  in Niger  (Norman,  1998).  Niger  law requires that irrigated land within
"state-developed" systems belong to the state.  However official policy requires all systems to be
organized as cooperatives with autonomy as the goal.  This has encouraged a gradual reduction
in state management and correspondingly complex rules regulating system operation.  As a result
farmers  can now pass  parcel  titles  on  to  family  members  and  subdivide individual  parcels
increasing user efficiency. Obviously, user groups cannot make decisions regarding water if they
have no rights over that water (Meinzen-Dick and Mendoza, 1996; Johnson, 1997).
In  addition  user-based  allocation  requires  collective action  institutions  with the  authority  to
influence water rights.  While empirical studies of water resource management have shown that
such institutions can be developed spontaneously or through an external catalyst, institutions are
not always in place or strong enough to make an impact (Meinzen-Dick et al., 1997). Easter and
Welsch (1986b) note that the strength of these collective action institutions is directly related to
water scarcity.  Water must be sufficierLtly  scarce as to provide the incentive to organize.  Also
affecting the viability of WUAs are the size and location of irrigation system (smaller systems
within  bounded  areas  lend  themselxes  to  farmer  cooperation),  relatively  equal  income
distributions (wide economic disparities may lead to conflicting interests), and freely available
infornation  on irrigation technology (Easter and Welsch, 1986b).
The effect of user-based allocation on Nater conservation depends on the content of local norms
and strength of local institutions (Easter, 1999). It is easier for users to organize collectively for
increasing water supply (a positive-sunt activity for membership) than for water distribution (at
best a zero-sum activity).  If the WJUA  does not actively promote efficient use, this allocation
23 Feder and Noronha (1987) provide a discussion of the positive effects of secure, legal ownership of property
(water rights).
27mechanism will have little effect in demand management.  However, social norms can provide a
strong incentive  for conservation,  particularly  if they  are backed  by  rules  against  excessive
consumption, monitoring of compliance, and sanctions against water waste.  Where members of
WUAs are conscious of the need to conserve, monitor, and trust other members to do the same
such that all are contributing to the common good, WUAs can achieve high efficiency in water
use (Feder and Noronha, 1987).
The  practical  functioning  of  WUAs  is  not  without  problems.  In  many  cases  the  WUA
organization  replaces  former  state-controlled  water  agencies  and  adopts  many  of  their
inefficiencies.  Marre et al. (1998) examines the case of low farmer participation in Mendoza,
Argentina.  They describe the problematic issue of low collection levels for irrigation services
(average 64%) and consequent degrading of irrigation infrastructure, which leads to  increased
levels of farmer  dissatisfaction with the  system.  As  a result most  fees  are used to  pay  for
recurrent costs (such as salaries) and a vicious circle in management results.  Marre et al. (1998)
advocate improvement of irrigation  services and  simultaneously discontinuing  flows to  non-
payers.  Similarly, Easter (1999) reviews  the successes (failures) of WlAs  in  several Asian
countries.  As a percent of cost-recovery WUAs collect 65% of fees in the Philippine, 70 % in
Andra Pradesh (India), 50% in Nepal, 79% in Indonesia, and 68% - 100% in Pakistan (Easter,
1999). There are several indicators used to  compare irrigation system efficiencies.  These are
divided  into  crop  output  based  measures  and  system.  These  indicators  are  described  and
illustrated in Molden et al. (1998) and Kloezen and Garces-Restrepo (1998).
4.3  Water Policy
The  water  policy  component  of  water  institution  includes  the  following  policy-related
institutional aspects:  project selection criteria, pricing and cost recovery, inter-regional!sectoral
water transfer, private sector participation, user participation, and linkages with other economic
policies (Saleth and Dinar, 1999). Water provision and management policy can be characterized
mainly according to levels of (de)centralization.  On the one extreme lie command and control
methods, in  which  quantities and  prices  are  determined at the  outset by  some  CWA  (e.g.,
Wanjiazhai Water Transfer Project, China - Qingtao et al., 1999). The opposite extreme consists
of decentralized methods based solely on market mechanisms (e.g., spot and options markets in
California  - Howitt,  1998).  In  between  lies  an  entire  policy  spectrum,  however,  as  more
irrigation systems adopt market mechanisms, water policy is increasingly being driven by the
necessity  to  define  water  rights  and  establish  water  markets to  facilitate  inter-regional  and
sectoral water transfers.
4.3.1  Centralized Policies
It is desirable to base prices on the marginal cost of acquiring more water or on its opportunity
cost.  However, prices based on marginal costs often are too high for low farm incomes.  For
example, farmers in India and Pakistan paid full costs of irrigation supply prior to WWII.  The
financial burdens incurred building huge irrigation projects during the 1950's were too large for
farmers to cover.  However, national policies of food security resulted in large subsidy schemes
for the irrigated water systems.  These trends have reversed in recent years, and users are being
asked to once again fully cover costs (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997).  This movement in India is
28not consistent and irrigation pricing varies substantially from state to state as determined by the
provincial water authority:  in West Bengal water rates vary by season, in Kerala rates are bases
solely on area cropped, in other states water prices vary by crop, season, and irrigation project,
irrigation type, category of water user, etc. (Saleth, 1997).
Several  pricing alternatives  have  arisen  to  cater  to  farmers'  ability to  pay  and to  promote
efficiency.  One alternative system of dual fees would use a low initial fee for quotas plus higher
marginal charges for  water consumed  in  excess  of the  quota.  If  these  quotas were  traded
between users, economic efficiency wou.d be enhanced.  The basic idea is that marginal prices
need to  be  flexible enough  to  ration  available water  supplies (Seagraves  and Easter,  1983).
There are a  variety of pricing  policies that  attempt to  approach marginal  cost pricitig while
balancing other considerations (such as  r.nformational,  structural, and environmental concerns).
Several empirical examinations of these policies are noted below.
Renzetti and Dupont (1999) evaluate a two-part water use charge.  The first is annual permit fee;
the second is a volumetric charge based on consumption.  The use of a permit fee will enhance
efficiency, improve water quality, increase government revenue, and improve the government's
knowledge base regarding water use. Algeria has recently adopted a two-part tariff similar to this
in  order  to  reflect the  full cost  of  service.  However, many  costs  (e.g.,  capital  equipment)
continue to be subsidized by the government (Salem, 1997).  Wichelns et al. (1996) evaluate a
California incentive program to  improvre on farm management  efficiencies  via  farn-specific
water allotments, tiered water pricing, and low-interest loans for irrigation equipment.  Results
confirm that economic incentives can be effective in generating improvements in water quality.
Recent reforms of water institutions are often coupled with new infrastructure investment.  In
Morocco, new infrastructure investments for the irrigated agriculture sector will be accompanied
by institutional reforms  aimed at improving water use efficiency.  One  such reform is water
pricing that covers true O&M costs ar.d that reflects the scarcity value of  water in  Morocco
(Dinar et al., 1998).
4.3.2  Transition Policies
The transition to market-based irrigatior pricing as mentioned earlier depends on the sets of rules
and institutions surrounding the agricultural systems already in place.  This inertia is difficult to
overcome due to a variety of constraints:  transaction costs (see Section 3.1.2.2), technological
constraints (see Section 3.3.2), and political constraints (see Section 5).  Zilberman et al. (1992)
posit that the availability of new techno ogy or institutional design may not suffice and that these
obstacles may require large random shocks to overcome (e.g., the California drought of the late
1980's).  Roumasset (1997) provides  an overview of the literature  and theory concerning the
institutional aspects of water pricing and derives optimal decentralization rules depending on the
policy environment.  Dinar and Subranranian (1997) identify several factors that encourage and
hinder policy reform: level of development (GDP per capita), per capita water availability, and
the size of the budget deficit to GDP. An example lying between central regulation and market
systems is Israeli differential pricing, which varies by sector and type of use (Just, Netanyahu,
and Horowitz, 1997). The Israeli goveinment sets water prices for users according to increasing
block-rate structure where different users face different marginal prices.  The block rate facing
agriculture is not the sarne for all users, but is determined by farm-specific quotas.
294.3.3  Market-Based  Policies
As mentioned, attributes such as external effects across users, temporal interdependencies, large
fixed  investments  costs,  and  uncertain  supplies,  all  tend  to  hamper  the  operation  of  water
markets,  hence  the prospect  to  attain  efficient  allocations  via markets  alone  (e.g.,  tubewell
market monopolies in Bangladesh - Ahmed and Sampath, 1988). Yet this is a weak argument
against  water  markets  and  in  favor  of  centralized  regulation,  as  the  latter  has  its  own
shortcomings, including information asymmetries, large implementation costs, and susceptibility
to the influence of pressure group and corruption.
The scope for water markets in allocating irrigation water is, therefore, far from negligible, and
the desired level of decentralization in any allocation mechanism is of prime importance. For
example, Brill, Hockman,  and Zilberman (1997)  compare  the efficiency gains  under  several
water policies to allocate water under reduced supply.  They show that the aforementioned, tiered
pricing schemes (e.g., Israel and California) result in second-best allocations.  Pareto efficient
allocations can be obtained via transferable water rights.  They argue that even when there does
not  exist  well-defined property  rights,  it  is  possible  to  avoid prohibitive  transactions  costs
involved with trades via a "passive trading" policy, which allows a Pareto efficient allocation.
Observations  such  as these  have lead  to  increased  interest  in  the  use  of  water markets  for
allocating  irrigation water (Dinar and Loehman,  1993; Brill, Hochman and Zilbernan,  1997;
Parker and Tsur, 1997; Spulber and Sabbaghi, 1998; Easter et al., 1998).
Saliba and Bush  (1987)  and more recently  Anderson  and  Snyder (1997)  describe  the trend
towards  water markets  in  the  American  Southwest  and  West. Examples  include:  intra-farm
trading  of  annual  federal  water  entitlements  (Fort  Collins,  CO);  water  banks  (Idaho  and
California);  between  agriculture  and  urban  users  (Utah,  Arizona,  Colorado,  and  Nevada);
between agriculture and environmental  concerns (Oregon); interbasin transfers  (Southwestern,
USA;  Australia, North America).  Wilson (1997) notes  reluctance  to  move from  centralized
water pricing in Arizona to water market pricing.
Water Permits and Trades
Roumasset  (1997)  examines  water  trading  schemes and  their  dependence  on  top-down  or
bottom-up regulation.  The optimal approach (whether top-down  or bottom-up)  is  shown  to
depend on such variables as transaction costs, asymmetric information, intertemporal and spatial
water supply.  Becker et al. (1997) discuss the potential for tradable water claims in the Middle
East.  Empirical analysis suggests that all parties benefit from either buying  or selling water.
However, farmers may be reluctant to trade their water entitlements (or rights) in the short-run if
they fear that they may lose them in the future.  Water trading also requires a well-developed
conveyance system  (Zilberman  et al.,  1997) and  the  existence of  appropriate  institutions  to
overlook transactions and resolve conflicts that may arise.  When these do not exist the existence
of  tradable water  rights  may lead  to  further inefficiencies  (Rosegrant  and  Schleyer,  1996).
Anderson and Snyder (1997b) note three arguments against market-based allocations: monopoly
power, imperfect capital markets, and externalities.
Benefits of transferable water entitlements and the establishment of formal water markets have
been noted in Australia (Musgrave,  1997), Chile (Hearne and Easter,  1998), Mexico (Hearne,
301998), Pakistan (Meinzen-Dick, 1998), India (Saleth, 1998), Spain (Garrido,  1998), and Canda
(Horbulyk and Lo, 1998).  Due to legal and institutional restrictions entitlement trading has not
been  as  active  as  expected.  However,  increased  acceptance of  trades  to  improve  delivery
certainty and efficiency should lead to increased trading and diversification of available market
contracts (e.g., entitlements to  storage space, groundwater, and pollution  dilution capacity of
streams). Dudley  and  Scott  (1998)  simLilate the  potential  of  water  markets  using  dynamic
optimization. These simulations  are used to  derive  short-run demand  functions for  reservoir
water and marginal opportunity costs for a variety of decisions. Once these opportunity costs are
determined, it is possible to derive optimal short-run water allocations.
Recently transfers of water rights have occurred for environmental amelioration (Anderson and
Snyder,  1997).  Huffman  (1983) details  how the Nature  Conservancy has purchased private
rights to  instream flows in Colorado and private individuals have purchased instream rights in
Montana in order to charge for fishing access.  Similar arrangements can be found in Oregon and
Arizona.  Willis et al. (1998) discuss farmer costs of contingent water contracts requiring the
agricultural  release  of  stored  irrigation  supplies  during  low  flow  years  during  critical  flow
periods  to  improve  salmon  migratiorn conditions.  Sunding  et  al.  (1994)  illustrate  that
environmental legislation in California aimed at reducing agricultural irrigation diversions will
lead to dramatic revenue and labor losses in the Central Valley.  Using a combination of models
(see Section 3.2.2.4) it is shown that water trading can reduce these losses substantially. Ise and
Sunding (1997)  examine the reallocation  of agricultural  water to  provide  for  environmental
restoration in Nevada's  Lahontan Valley.
International trading agreements, few in number, have recently gained exposure. The treatments
of cross-border water trading in North America are reviewed in Anderson (1994).  Frisvold and
Caswell (1997) note the beneficial role aid agencies may have when negotiating international
water agreements. A recent  example of this  is the Mekong River agreement and international
water  allocation  agreements  (Browder  and  Ortolano,  1999).  An  important  caveat  of  this
agreement was that international donors agreed to subsidize the Mekong operations and water
negotiations.
Water Banks
Water banks are a special case of water trading and have been promoted as a means to allocate
water  in  a  more  flexible  manner,  subject  to  the  limitation  of  large  quantity  transfers.
Comprehensive discussion of arrangements for these specialized water rights for several states
and in general framework for setting up a water bank can be found in MacDonnell et al. (1994).
These are described as  "institutionaliz-,d mechanism[s]  specifically  designed to  facilitate the
transfer of water use entitlements". They review the water recharge programs  in 19 states and
examine 5 actual banking programs in terms of legislation, logistics, and effects.
Archibald and Renwick (1998) model gains from water trades and look at the transaction costs
and incentives inherent in the California State Water Bank.  They find that despite significant
welfare gains possible from increased tiaffic in water trades, there are policy-induced transaction
costs that retard the California system.
31Market Extensions
The need to stabilize stochastic supply may require the development of spot and options markets,
whereas the permanent shifts in demand may be best realized via a  system of tradable water
rights.  Spot and option prices are examined for new emerging markets in California (Howitt,
1998). He  notes that  the evolution  from  spot to  options  markets may mitigate  the  costs of
developing  alternative trading  systems for permanent water rights  in  LDCs.  These market
developments are simulated using experimental economics for the San Joaquin Valley and then
extended  to  other  countries  (Dinar,  Howitt,  Rassenti, and  Smith,  1998).  They  show  that
experimental simulations based on a sample Central Valley scenario can generate competitive
outcomes.
5.  THE POLITICAL ECONOMIES OF WATER PRICING
The role of politics in reformn,  setting utility charges, tariffs and other prices that are subject to
policy influence has long .ttracted the attention of economists.  In some places the provision of
free irrigation water is viewed as a human rights issue and pricing water is considered politically
unacceptable.  In such cases, indirect pricing (via output/input or per area pricing)  might be
considered.  The observation that agricultural sectors in developed economies tend to be highly
subsidized in contrast to those in LDCs is often attributed to political forces (de Gorter and Tsur,
1991).  For example, land cultivation may serve the purpose of self-sustained food production,
even though it is more economical to import some of the food.  In places where water is scarce,
this subsidy often includes water directly.
These  issues have  been  discussed  in  Section  3,  yet  there  remains  to  be  a  more  detailed
examination of the issue of political economies in water allocation and its literature. Increased
water scarcity and quality concerns have generated new approaches to water management and
reform.  Water pricing reform among them, has been noted recently in quite a few countries'.
However, pricing reform in practice often does not adhere to first-best allocations as prescribed
by the classical economic framework.  Second-best or third-best outcomes often result from
special  interest group  pressures,  or  political  economies.  For  example, when  examining  the
provision of water, political constraints can be interpreted as part of implementation costs (e.g.,
San Joaquin Valley - Shah and Zilberman, 1995).  In this  section I will review the literature
surrounding the theory of political economy of water pricing and reform.
5.1  Theory
Rent seeking occurs when decision-makers use the government to increase their personal wealth
at the expense of others.  Roumasset (1987) states, "...  heavily subsidized irrigation design,
construction, operation and maintenance invites pork-barrel politics  and rent-seeking motives,
that overcome the incentives for efficient provision of irrigation services." Anderson and Snyder
(1997b) posit that government regulation is inherently inefficient due to public choice for the
24  See  for  recent  OECD  water  pricing  reforms,  OECD  (1999)  and  Jones  (1999);  see  for the  Near  East,  Ahmed
(1999),  and  for an  additional  22 select  countries,  Dinar  and  Subramanian  (1997).
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interests, politicians are short-sighted with respect to policy, and  there are few incentives for
candidates to account for individual pref  rences.  Similarly, reform efforts, which result in a
redistribution of economic benefits, will generate significant political opposition.  Interest groups
will form to impact the reform process so i:hat  the end results best serve their constituents.  These
political groups may slow, divert, or stop desirable reforms (e.g., Morocco - Dinar et al., 1998).
In  his  book,  Cadillac  Dessert,  Marc  Reisner  aptly  describes  the  result  of  rent-seeking  in
irrigation projects.  He details the history of "pork-barrel politics and rent-seeking motives" in
the American West from the time of early Mormon settlers in Utah to current intrigues with the
water lobbyists.
The literature in this vein is quite dispersed, but it is possible to identify three main approaches.
The first is the interest group approach (Backer, 1983).  Here political decisions are viewed as
the outcome of a struggle between pressure groups (also Panagariya and Rodrik, 1993).  Second
is the politician-voter interaction approach where the interaction between voters  and support-
maximizing politicians result in policy (Peltzman, 1976; Hillman,  1989; de Gortner and Tsur,
1991). Lastly are the bargaining process models (Zusman, 1976), where policies are determined
via a  bargaining  process with  players  of  different  power  (also  Scarpa,  1994; Jordon,  1995,
Finkelshtein and Kislev, 1997; Zusman, 1997, Ruasser and Zusman, 1991, 1998).
Grossman  and Helpman  (1994) offer  a  synthesis  approach that  incorporates  principal-agent
theory with  pressure  group activity.  In  addition  there  have been  recent  extensions to  these
approaches  incorporating  environmental  aspects  of  water  management.  These  include
cooperative  game  studies  looking  at  incentives  for  individuals  to  participate  in  group
management schemes (Bardhan, 1993; HIurwicz, 1998); in the exploitation of common property
resources  (Ligon and Narain,  1997; Becker  and Easter,  1998); and  the literature  surrounding
environmental regulation (Laffont and T role, 1996; Chen et al., 1998; Loehman, 1998).
5.2  Applications to Irrigation Water
Recent  studies  looking at  irrigation  water reform  often  will  employ  one  or  more  of  these
approaches  to  model  the  political  economy  involved.  For  example,  lobbying  efforts  for
irrigation in  the  American  West have possibly  provided the  greatest  source  of  material  for
political economy water studies.  Already mentioned, Reisner (1993) traces the history of U.S.
land reclamation in the West, taking rains  to highlight  the highly subsidized, inefficient, and
inequitable  nature  of  the  irrigation  water  provided  by  Congress  to  western  states.  He
hypothesizes that  a significant reason  behind President Carter's  resounding  election  defeat in
1980 was  due  to  his  opposition to  iunding "a  couple  dozen"  extremely  questionable  and
expensive irrigation projects.  Rucker and Fishback (1983) examine the early activities of the
Bureau of  Reclamation following the Reclamation Act  of  1902 using  a  simple  rent-seeking
model.  Gardner  (1983)  discusses  how  in  the  irrigation economy  of  California, water  is  a
constraining input and is often priced below the value of its use.  Both of these studies use the
difference between optimal prices and actual prices as evidence of rent seeking and describe how
these rents eventually  dissipate with  Ainrther  rent-seeking  behavior.  Another  early California
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approach can all be found in water pricing (Cuzan, 1983).
However, as a framework for describing this literature, it is useful to understand the reasons for
reform,  the  institutions  undergoing  reform,  who  is  supporting/opposing  the  reform  and
compensation mechanisms, and possible international influences on the reform process (Dinar,
2000).  This framework traces reform efforts from its initial stages to post-reform effects, and
resembles similar examinations of reform found in White (1990), Krueger (1991), Williamson
(1994) and Haggard and Webb (1996).
5.2.1  Reasons for Reform
In many cases reform efforts directed at water pricing are simply the results of financial crisis,
low cost recovery percentages, deteriorating  facilities, and increasing water demand (e.g., for
Asia - Easter, 1987; for Egypt - Wichelns, 1998; for Pakistan - Wambia, 2000).  However, there
are often other motives such as linking water sector reform to other macroeconomic reforms that
are indirectly related (e.g., for Morocco - Diao and Roe, 2000; for Yemen - Ward, 2000). Just et
al. (1997) observe that standard economic analyses contend that economic efficiency is improved
by equating  prices and  that  current deviations are the result of political  power.  A different
interpretation for Israel and Jordan are concerns for food security, infant-industry motivations,
settlement policies (national security), and equity issues.  It may be more efficient to partially
equalize water prices when new water supplies are developed.  Such political power framework
incorporating lobbying has been used to evaluate optimal environmental regulation mechanisms.
The mechanism  of  environmental  regulation  will  depend on  the  weights  society  places  on
laborers and capitalists (Chen et al. 1998).
5.2.2  Institutions and Reform
As previously mentioned, the institutional framework and its changing nature  are intrinsically
lined to political economy considerations.  These considerations include existing institutions, the
power system, and the electoral system.
Existing Institutions
Decentralization of existing water institutions often comes with some reluctance (Wilson, 1997),
which may impair the effectiveness of reform.  It is often necessary to actively engage existing
bureaucracies in the reform process (de Azevedo and Asad, 2000) or to induce farmers to view
water management as a ,ublic  good (Bromley, 2000) in order to overcome political transaction
costs in reform.  Garrido (1998) compares allocations between conventional profit maximization
for  an  individual farm, an  intra-community  water market,  and  to  an  inter-community  water
market.  Empirical  estimates were  generated using  EPIC  (see  appendix)  as  well as  on  site
experimental research.  The resulting allocations were shown to be sensitive to transaction costs,
but that decentralization generates a range of short-run probable gains.
Rausser and Zusman (1991) examine the political  history of collective action in  Western US
water resource systems.  Their model includes a (n+2) player game: the CWA seeks to maximize
cost  efficiencies  and  political  recognition,  n-districts  seek  to  maximize  profit,  and  the
government pursues  both  selfish and  unselfish  "public  interest"  goals.  The resulting  model
determines  water  prices  in  what  Rausser  and  Zusman  term  as  the  "Hydrological-Political-
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be met:  a uniform distribution  of power  and that all districts account for  ground-water level
effects.  Building on this model, Zusmank  (1997) incorporates asymmetric information into the
optimal regulation regime.  The optimal regulator  size should be  controlled to  minimize  the
political  power  distortions caused  by  rent  seeking.  This  will  also  minimize  operating  and
transaction costs in the system.
The Political Establishment
The political  establishment  includes  political  parties,  electoral  systems,  and  interest  groups.
These groups form a dynamic atmosphere in which the reform process occurs.  Rausser (2000)
provides a game theoretic and a bargaining approach to evaluating this dynamic interaction for
water policy reform. The strengths of the various groups depend on such things as informational
power, which can lead to  second-best Ellocations, and are thus  important when planning and
implementing water pricing reform.  Tsur (2000) illustrates how asymmetric information can
lead to second-best allocations in pricing reform.  Cueva and Lauria (2000) and Renzetti (2000)
illustrate how such second-best allocations can arise from ignoring the power system and how to
incorporate them into third-best reform efforts.
The electoral system that determnines  how laws are changed and what direction reform efforts
will  take  are  encompassed  in  the  political  establishment.  McCann  and  Zilberman  (2000)
examine the results of water district voting in California.  They note that resulting allocation
depend on the electoral rules.  In some instances (property-weighted voting) district managers
will not seek to maximize consumer welfare.  In Dinar, Balakrishnan, and Wambia (1998) the
actions of politicians in the water sector are endogenized to estimate the political risks associated
with  reform.  They  develop a  two-tiered  approach  to  first  assess power  distribution  among
groups interested in reform effects, and then to incorporate a Delphi process (summary of expert
opinions) to determine the risks associated with reform.  This approach is used to examine the
National Drainage Program Project in Pakistan.  An extension of the politician-voter literature to
include the trade-offs between environmental policy and rent producing firms that pollute can be
found in Boyer and Laffont (1996).  They show that the thinner the majority of environmentally
conscious voters and the larger the informational rents, the more the politician's  objectives are
biased  away  from  social  welfare.  These  incentives  are  subject to  change  when  reelection
considerations affect reputation and social control.
5.2.3  Support  and Opposition
As touched on earlier, water pricing anld  reform creates a dynamic interaction between existing
institutions and the political establishment.  Dinar (2000) contains reviews of reform efforts in 5
countries (see  appendix), which documnent  the  supporting and  opposing groups in these  case
studies.  In most cases (Musgrave, 200  ; de Azevedo and Asad, 2000; Kemper and Olson, 2000;
Ward, 2000)  the reform  efforts  stemmed  from  existing inefficiencies in  pricing  policy  (i.e.,
subsidized irrigation water).  However, environmental quality can also be a motivating factor
(waterlogging and salinity -Wambia, 2  000).
5.2.4  Compensation Mfechanisms
Opposition to  water  sector reform  is often subverted via payoff  mechanisms  that reimburse
negatively affected parties.  For exanmple,  the optimal regulation model developed in Zusman
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constraint that system costs should be fully covered by system revenues.  In addition, I have
mentioned earlier the need to include affected interest groups in the reform process (de Azevedo
and Asad, 2000).  In addition to including  existing institutions, it is also  necessary to weigh
equity  and  environmental  concerns when  planning- and  implementing  water pricing  reform.
Boland and Whittington (2000) conclude that often reform in LDC water pricing policy comes
with unaccounted adverse effects on poor households.  It may be necessary to balance the need
to increase efficiency with that of enhancing equity.
Other payoff mechanisms include sharing of reform benefits or compensation of reform costs.
For example, Diao and Roe  (1999, 2000) show how water reform can be coupled with trade
reform to  generate  a  win-win  situation  for  Moroccan  agriculture.  They  employ  a  general
equilibrium treatment of trade and water reform in the Moroccan agricultural sector to estimate
investment  and  economic  growth  responses.  They  note  that  there  will  most  likely  be
reallocations  of  resources  from  import  competing  crops  to  the  production  of  fruits  and
vegetables.  The resulting change in  return to  sector-specific assets will likely  cause interest
group conflict opposing the trade reforms.  This tension may provide an opening to reform the
irrigation  pricing  policies,  and  reimburse  the  import  competing  agricultural  sector  with
consequential efficiency gains.
5.2.5  International Influence
Barrett  (1994) includes a  discussion  of the management  of  conflict with  international water
resources.  He examines previous water laws and treaties in the simple Nash-game viewpoint.
Cases include the Columbia River Treaty (Canada and the US) and the Indus River Treaty (India
and Pakistan).  He then goes on to describe Coase's  Theorm and  its implications  for a Nash-
game type of scenario.  This ignores the equity aspect of water resource issues as between two
countries and possible externalities imposed (Diao and Roe,  1995).  Hurwicz (1998) extends a
Coasian economy  I Nash  equilibrium to  include market  mechanisms  to  achieve  the optimal
allocations.
Howitt and Vaux (1995) describe the formation of water coalitions in California as a cooperative
game driven by rents accruing to economies of scale in sharing costs.  A similar  cooperative
outcome for international water resource exploitation is modeled in Becker and Easter (1998)
depending on the number of participants and the degree of cooperation induced by economic
incentives.  Frisvold and  Caswell (1997) develop  a game-theoretic  approach to  describe the
Nash-like  scenario facing  countries  involved  in  transboundary  water transfers  and pollution
abatement agreements.  They conclude that international development assistance can encourage
joint water quality projects. This carrot-approach to encouraging international water agreements
may be an effective way for the international donor community to deal with water conflicts (e.g.,
Mekong River agreement - Browder  and Ortolano,  1999).  The opposite (stick) approach to
encourage  cooperative  bargaining  agreements  for  environmental  regulation  is  described  in
Loehman  (1998).  Here  cost  sharing  among  polluters  and  sufferers  is  required  for  Pareto
improvements via cooperative bargaining.
Roe and Diao (1997) use a general equilibrium treatment of a shared water aquifer to evaluate
one country's  water policy  on  another country.  Various water tax, subsidy, and  technology
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Heckscher-Olin framework to represent extraction effects of one country on another country's
water endowment.  Results imply each country has an incentive to subsidize water use and, thus,
lessen water availability to the other courntry. The optimal solution is for a cooperative tax on
water use in each country.  This simple m:del  (similar to a Nash-game) can be used to represent
in  a stylized manner the  case of Israel  and Jordan.  Other international influences  on water
reform include loan conditionalities (Krueger et al., 1991) and trade agreements (Dinar, 2000).
6.  CONCLUDING  COMMENTS
As indicated in the executive summary, there is quite a range of issues the touch directly and
indirectly  on irrigation water pricing.  [ have  attempted to  include  and  synthesize the most
relevant literature under the seven broad section headings. Rather than provide a summary and
reference list at the end of each of those sections I do so here.  However, for those that do not
have unfettered access to these studies, i t is hoped that the discussion provided under the broad
section headings will prove useful and relevant to current pricing policy questions.
I would like to first focus on several literature sources essential for this review.  Above all, the
Natural Resource Management and Policy Series published by Kluwer Academic Publishers 25 as
edited by Ariel Dinar and David Zilberman is an excellent source of informnation  for irrigation
practitioners and policy makers.  They review a vast array of recent research and often contain
empirical applications and case studies.  In this series I have drawn heavily from:
*  Conflict and Cooperation on Trans-Boundary Water Resources, edited by Richard Just
and Sinaia Netanyahu.
*  Markets for  Water: Potential and Performance, edited by K. William Easter, Mark W.
Rosegrant, and Ariel Dinar.
*  Decentralization and Coordinaton  of Water Resource Management, edited by Douglas
D. Parker and Yacov Tsur.
*  Economics of  Water Resources.  From Regulation to Privatization, edited by Nicolas
Spulber and Asghar Sabbaghi.
*  The Economics and Management of Water and Drainage in Agriculture, edited by Ariel
Dinar and David Zilberman.
In addition to these, the IIMI6 research report series and the review by Dinar and Subramanian
(1997) provide a current overview of th1e  prevailing irrigation systems found around the world.
Other reviews used extensively in this survey are:
*  Designing  Institutions for  Env,ronmental  and Resource Management,  edited by  Edna
Tusak Loehman and D. Marc Kilgour.
25 Kluwer  Academic  Publishers: 101  Philip  Drive / Assinippi  Park / Norwell,  MA  02061  / USA or Distribution
Centre  / Post Office  Box 322  / 3300  AH Dordrecht  / The  Netherlands.
26 International  Irrigation  Management  Institute  / P.O.  Box 2075  / Colombo,  Sri Lanka.
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Edna Tusak Loehman.
*  Sustainability, Growth, and Poverty Alleviation, edited by Stephen A. Vosti and Thomas
Reardon.
*  The Political Economy of Water Pricing Reforms, edited by Ariel Dinar.
These and the many other studies, case studies, and research articles that I have outlined in the
survey indicate that the methods surrounding irrigation water pricing have  many dimensions,
both theoretical and practical.  That these issues will become increasingly important, as future
water and food demands increase, is not in question.  Efficiently pricing water will help meet
these increasing demand, but what is the best way to increase pricing efficiency?  Many argue
that water markets offer one solution, however, under which circumstances are water markets
viable?  What effect will decentralization have on farm production and the rest of the economy?
What are the forces that are moving towards decentralization or (re)centralization? The answers
to these questions are complex and often site specific, which is why the list of case studies in the
appendix may assist in locating useful comparisons to other sites.  In the following section I will
summarize the main points found earlier in the survey.
Water Pricing Methods
A variety of pricing methods and various studies aimed at determining the efficiency and equity
of those methods have been outlined.  A brief summary of these methods is found below  (see
also Tsur and Dinar 1995, 1997).  To reflect the different means of evaluating pricing efficiency
and  equity, these methods have been compared across  several broad categories:  difficulty of
implementation, potential efficiency, time horizon of efficiency, ability to control demand, affect
on income distribution and on water quality (see Table 2).
Volumetric Pricing (Marginal Cost Pricing)
A volumetric pricing policy in which the price of water is equal to the marginal cost of supply
achieves first-best efficiency.  A departure from marginal cost pricing may be required if the
pricing mechanism seeks to recover capital depreciation and other fixed costs.  In this situation,
volumetric pricing can achieve a second-best efficient allocation.  As (homogenous) farmers will
face the same price, income inequality is due solely to land endowments and is not affected by
pricing 27. Marginal  costs  of  supply  will  increase  as  water  quality  erodes  and  therefore
volumetrically charged prices will increase as well to reveal the real value of water. Countries
employing volumetric pricing include 28:  India (OM-CD), Jordan (OM), Mexico OM), Morocco
(OM), England OM-CD), France (OM-CD), Australia (OM), U.S.A. (OM-CD), and Israel (OM-
CD).
Output and Input Pricing
Because output taxes and zero price of water may distort input/output decisions the equilibrium
allocation is second best.  Any measure of income equality will likewise be  affected by land
endowments and not by the pricing mechanism. As output taxes are not assessed until the crop is
27 Rhodes  and Sampath  (1987) illustrate  how the optimal  pricing  mechanism  depends  heavily on the relative  capital
intensities  between  small  and large farmers.
28 OM = seeks  to at least  partly  recover  operation  and  management  costs;  CD = seeks  to at least partly  recovery
capital  depreciation  (Tsur  and Dinar, 1995).
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input taxes will be  assessed at the  begiraing  of the  growing season and  are not  flexible to
changing water quality conditions in the short-run.
Per Area Pricing
Demand under this pricing mechanism is larger than that under marginal cost pricing rule, hence
the resulting allocations will be inefficient.. It is possible to influence water demand directly via
differential  fee schemes.  As  before, income  inequality is linked to  land endowments and  is
unchanged by the pricing scheme.  Similarly to output pricing, per area pricing is not flexible to
changing  water quality  conditions  in  tke  short-run.  Countries  employing  per  area  pricing
include 29:  China (OM), India (groundwater), Iraq, Mexico (OM), Nigeria (OM), Pakistan (OM),
Peru (OM-CD), Philippines (OM), and Zimbabwe (OM).
Tiered Pricing
This pricing method is common when water demand has period variations:  during low demand
periods  (supply > demand) marginal cost pricing achieves (short-run) efficiency;  during peak
demand periods (demand 2 supply) pricIng accounts for the scarcity value of water (marginal
supply costs plus shadow price of water availability).  This method does not affect the income
inequality of homogenous farmers and  Ellows some flexibility in dealing with changing water
quality.  Another tiered pricing method (increasing blocks) discounts prices in favor of irrigators
(relative to  domestic  or industry),  whkh  may  in the long  run negatively  affect  measures of
efficiency, equity, and water quality.  If this second tiered method is coupled with water quotas
allocated on an equal basis between farms  (independent of size) the resulting  allocations will
redistribute rent from larger farms to smaller farms.  Tiered pricing systems can be  found in
Israel (coupled with  a  multi-rate volumetric  method)  and in  California (also  coupled with  a
multi-rate volumetric method).
Two-part Tariff
By  introducing the  admission fixed charge to  balance the budget of the  CWA, the short-run
efficiency of marginal cost pricing is extended to account for long-run fixed cost considerations.
An annual Pigouvian  tax  avoids  distortionary  affects of other taxing  forms  and is  therefore
capable of achieving long-run efficiency.  Two-part water tariffs used to recover total operating
costs may discriminate against farmers as many argue social benefits of  irrigation accrue not
only to farmers, but also to consumers of farm products.  As with volumetric pricing, this pricing
mechanism will reflect  increasing  marginal costs  of  supply  and  is flexible to  water quality
changes.
Water Markets
Water markets will achiev.- first-best allocations under specialized conditions.  Water markets
rarely exhibit all these conditions, but the resulting second-best allocations may be more efficient
than  those  achieved  under  the  preceding  methods.  This  is  due  to  the  internalization  of
information collection  and  absence  of  strong  CWA to  administer water  allocations.  Water
markets in noncompetitive environments can lead to monopoly pressures on water prices, which
29 As above.
39are likely to  adversely affect income  distributions.  They do allow the  greatest flexibility  in
responding to changing water quality and will reflect the real value of water.
40Table  1:  Comparison  of Pricing Methods with Efficiency / Equity I Water  Quality Management
Potential  *Affect on  Adaptability to
Pricing  Implementation  Efficiency  Time Horizon  Ability to  Intra-Sectoral  Water Quality
Scheme  Achieved  of Efficiency  Control Demand  Income  Conditions
Distribution
Single-rate
Volumetric  Complicated  First-best  Short-run  Easy  Small / None  Easy
Output / Input  Less Complicated  Second-  Short-run  Relatively Easy  Small / None  Difficult
best  Through Variable
Per Area  Easy  None  N/A  Cropping  Small / None  Difficult
Restrictions/ Fees
Relatively  Relatively
Tiered  Complicated  First-best  Short-run  Easy  Moderate  Easy
Relatively  Relatively  Relatively
Two-Part  Complicated  First-best  Long-run  Easy  Moderate  Easy
Depends on  Depends on
Water  Difficult  First-best  Short-run /  Type of  Type of Market  Easy
Markets  Long-run  Market
Source:  Adapted from Tsur and Dinar (1995).
*  The potential for redistribution depends on the assumption of homogenous farmers.  In cases where farmers are employing
different technologies and are growing different crops, pricing mechanisms can target certain agricultural sectors to pay more
or less than other sectors.
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There are various means by which one could outline and summarize the broad swath of literature
surrounding the theory of irrigation water pricing.  I have separated these articles into three broad
headings:  partial equilibrium, general equilibrium, and water quality management.  The majority
of studies on irrigation water pricing are partial equilibrium in nature and attempt to  explain
deviations from first-best allocations.  Examples are:  Vermillion (1997) and Easter, Becker, and
Tsur (1997) regarding the public good nature of irrigation services; Rosegrant and Binswanger
(1994) Tsur and Dinar (1997), and Barrett and Sinclair (1999) regarding implementation costs;
Loehman  and Dinar  (1994) and  Smith and  Tsur  (1997) concerning  asymmetric information;
MacDonnell et al. (1994) and Willis et al. (1998) on third party effects; Tsur (1990, 1997), Tsur
and  Graham-Tomasi (1991),  and Moreno  et al.  (1999) on  supply  scarcity; and  Spulber  and
Spagghati (1998) on returns-to-scale.  There is a significant literature concerning the equity of
irrigation pricing.  The main works include Rhodes and Sampath (1988), Sampath (1991, 1992),
and Tsur and Dinar (1995).
Smaller in size, but not in importance, are the general equilibrium and water quality management
studies.  These studies investigate not necessarily deviations from first-best equilibrium, but the
effects  of implementing pricing  or environmental  policies  on the  agricultural  sector and  the
economy as a whole.  Key among the general equilibrium studies are Robinson et al. (1993), Roe
and Diao  (1995,  1997), Goulder  et al. (1999), and Diao  and Roe (1998).  The water quality
literature can be divided into those studies examining water pollution and that examining water
conservation.  Key pollution studies include the review by Dinar and Zilberman (1991), Biswas
(1997), Segerson (1988), Kim et al. (1997), and Goetz and Zilberman (1998).  Notable in the
conservation literature are several recent economic reviews of the management for groundwater
systems  (Gisser,  1983;  Tsur  and  Zemel,  1995;  Zilberman,  1997)  and  for  conjunctive
management with surface water (Tsur, 1990; Boggess et al., 1993; Zilberrnan, 1997).
Water Law and Property Rights
Water law and property rights highlight the effects of already linked  legal aspects of conflict
resolution  and  accountability.  It  influences  water policy  via effects  on  water  pricing,  cost
recovery, management decentralization, and private sector participation.  Water law and rights
effect  water  administration  because  of  implementation  mechanisms,  user  participation,  and
management  decentralization.  Saleth and  Dinar  (1999) have  determined  that  there are  four
critical variables that effect performnance  of water law:  integrated treatment  of water sources,
effectiveness of conflict resolution, degree of integration within water law, and legal scope for
private  sector  participation.  As  mentioned  the  water  law  component  of  water  institutions
incorporates other factors as well.  These include the following law-related institutional aspects:
provisions  for  conflict resolution  (Dinar  and Loehman,  1995), provisions  for  accountability,
scope for private  sector participation, centralization tendency,  and degree of  legal integration
within water law (Saleth and Dinar, 1999).
Water Administration
Reform efforts targeted at government provision of irrigation water services hinted at in earlier
sections, are  largely  due  to  the  realization  of  government  failures.  These  failures  include:
misallocated  project  investments,  overextended  government  agencies,  inadequate  service
delivery to the poor, neglect of water quality and environmental concerns, and the underpricing
of water resources.Consequently, reform efforts targeted at water supply have been increasing. This reform is linked
to the aforementioned government failure, but is mainly due to three reasons:  lack incentives
and responsiveness to optimize management performance, management transfers  coupled with
supportive social and technical support wil. result in improved system quality and efficiency, and
management  transfers  will  save  the  government  money  in  terms  of  reduced  O&M
responsibilities.
To address other market failures associated with the provision of irrigation water, other reform
efforts have been targeted at the implementation of Water User Associations.  It has been shown
that WUAs  tend to  substantially reduce  the costs of implementing water pricing (Easter  and
Welsch,  1986b; Wade,  1987).  The associations have  economic incentives to  maximize net
benefits generated by their activities (Winichelns, 1998), which include both  increasing supply
efficiency and production efficiency (Kloezen et al., 1997).  However, the impact of WUAs on
irrigation performance requires evaluation to determine whether these new the gains from farmer
participation are not outweighed by increased costs in  other areas. For example, an important
indicator measuring the successes of new management regimes are levels of transaction costs
(Feeny, 1998).
Note  that this  process  of  decentralization of  O&M  and  of  farmer  participation  is  far  from
complete.  Ruttan (1998) notes that instituitional  design remains problematic and those capable of
balancing efficiency and equity must "...  proceed on an ad hoc, trial-and-error basis, and errors
continue to be expensive."  Meinzen-Dick (1997) points out that long-run farmer participation in
the system may be the most  important performance indicator of WUAs, which  has yet to be
measured for most countries.
Water Policies
The  movement from  centralized water pricing to  decentralized market-based  mechanisms  is
occurring globally.  Recent examples frcm a variety of countries (Dinar and Subramanian, 1997)
confirm that, even in countries with centralized water structures, there is an increasing realization
that water subsidies to the agricultural sector and government inefficiencies require higher water
prices and better marketing institutions to meet increasing scarcity.  To meet this need, a large
interdisciplinary  body  of  literature  lhas  emerged  to  address  different  aspects  of  water
management under various conditions.  The wide range of policies currently being promoted to
price  and  market  irrigation  water  c;n  be  loosely  grouped  from  centralized  policies  to
decentralized,  market-based  policies.  Some  of  these  have  been  described  above  (see  also
appendix).  Easter et al. (1998) discuss the potential future of water markets.  They note the
potential economic benefits from water markets are likely to be very large in the future subject to
transaction costs.  To keep these costs low requires appropriate institutional and organizational
structures as well as flexible infrastruc:;ure  and management.  Spot markets for water combined
with options markets may provide sufficient security to farmers for these efficiency gains and
low transaction costs, even if legally enforceable water rights are difficult to establish.
An alternative categorization of policies  addressing water scarcity  is supply management  vs.
demand management.  Supply management seeks to increase the available water supply.  Some
examples  are  extracting  from  local  aquifers,  bringing  in  more  water  from  water-abundant
regions,  or  decreasing  water outflow  (by a  system  of dams).  Exploitation  of  ground water
sources is one potential area of increased supply (Rosegrant and  Perez, 1997). The future of
supply management policies is beconming  limited, as most of the diversion projects, dams, and
43aquifers that pass a  cost-benefit test have already  been exploited and the remaining sites are
either too costly or involve international disagreements.  Technological advances may increase
the feasibility of future irrigation projects, but  as mentioned most  recent  efforts are directed
towards existing system modernization. As a consequence nontraditional sources are likely to be
a major component of new water supplies: desalinization, recycling, water catchment systems
(Rosegrant, 1997; Rosegrant and Meinzen-Dick, 1996).
Demand management  seeks to  encourage  more efficient use  of  available water.  These have
historically been ignored for the most part, and hence convey a  large potential  for managing
scarcity.  A demand management policy of irrigation water consists of a combination of quotas,
and prices.  It may be centralized, operating in a command-and-control fashion, or decentralized
to various degrees, allowirng  certain market mechanisms in which water users are free to decide
on their water intake.  Potential efficiencies in water use resulting from demand strategies will
serve  to  extend  scarce  water  resources  (e.g.,  the  development  and  adoption  of  resource-
augmenting techniques  had been  well documented:  Caswell et al.,  1993; Shah  et al,  1995).
Policies that rely on quotas are typically more centralized, while pricing policies can be either
centralized or decentralized.  These policies have been already touched on earlier, but also are
evident in the case studies mentioned in the appendix.
Political Economies of Pricing Irrigation Water
Merrey (1997) at IIMI comments, "Everyone involved in irrigation and water resource issues
claims to recognize that  institutional, policy,  and political  issues are central  causes of poor
performance.  But it has proven  difficult to focus  governments'  and donors'  attention on these
matters, and develop long-term  solutions that can  be  implemented"  However, compared  to
other aspect  of irrigation water pricing,  studies  both theoretic  and  empirical  of the political
economies of pricing are relatively unexplored.  These concerns are extremely important when
trying to balance optimal allocations and pricing policies with equity concerns.
Several promising avenues for this research include extensions of rent-seeking models to water
management case studies, game theory extensions to dynamic  and non-cooperative  games in
water pricing, and further use of computable general equilibrium models to explore the effects
macroeconomic policies oii the irrigated agricultural sector.  Examples of these include Zusman
(1997), Frisvold and Caswell (1997), and Diao and Roe (1999) respectively.
Another channel for productive analysis in this area is the application  of endogenous growth
theory to decentralization in irrigation management, to technology adoption and innovation, and
to growth effects of income distribution.  Aghion and Howitt (1998) discuss these issues in their
comprehensive text, Endogenous Growth Theory.  They note that redistributive policies in the
form  of  transferred  resources  may  enhance  aggregate  incentives.  This  has  important
implications for the projected impacts of pricing reform in terms of agriculture sector growth.
Vosti and Reardon (1997) address these concerns in their review: Sustainability,  Growth and
Poverty Alleviation.  They focus on the links between the adverse affects of rural poverty on
development, political stability, and the environment.
It should be noted that water scarcity has often led to a history of disputes and conflicts. These
have generated enormous costs and adversely affected populations of people.  One example is
the displaced population  problem associated  with  large dam projects (e.g.,  Shuikou, China -
Thayer,  1997).  Postel (1999) reviews the history of irrigation-based societies and argues that
44disruptions  in  the  orderly working  of  irrigation  water  supplies  were  main  reasons  for  the
downfall of  many ancient societies (Sumeria, Babylon, and  Assyria).  Recent  conflicts  over
water are detailed for the Middle East and Asian subcontinent (Gleick, 1993, 1997; McCaffrey,
1993; Postel, 1999) and for the American West  (Colby, 1997; Gleick, 1997).  The resolution of
these conflicts often follows  strictly political  lines.  Dinar  and Loehman (1993) review  case
studies in water conflicts and theoretical approaches to their resolution.
Summary
Water scarcity is an ever-growing global problem.  Increased population  pressures, improved
living  standards  and  growing  demands  for  environmental  quality,  have  all  prompted
governments to find better ways to manage their available water resources.  Most ecQnomists
agree that if water users pay the marginal, cost of supplying that water, significant movements
towards increasing our water management efficiency would be made.  Section 3 discusses the
many peculiarities associated with irrigation systems make it difficult to quantify and charge via
marginal cost pricing.  This would increase the cost of irrigation water for most farmers globally.
The equity of marginal cost pricing is also in question as many small farmers would not be able
to continue farming under such a pricing rnechanism.  There is continued debate as to the role of
irrigation and farming as  a developmenl. tool and  as a  means to  redistribute wealth to  both
producers  and consumers via cheaper staple food prices.  As the general  equilibrium section
illustrates, one  means to  enhance  water management  efficiency is to  allow inter-regional  or
international trading of water.  The caveat to this  argument as with  marginal cost pricing,  is
whether  these  trades  or  pricing  mechamisms are  long-run  solutions,  when  environmental
concerns are incorporatedi.
Necessary for implementing any pricing policies are the various water institutions discussed in
Section  4.  These  are also  undergoing  significant changes  stemming  from  increased  water
demand.  There  are quite  a  number  of case  studies  mentioned that  trace  the  movement  in
countries'  irrigation  management  from  centralized  water  authorities  to  decentralized  water
supplier and water user organizations.  The policies associated with these changes reflect the
aforementioned movement towards market-based means to price water.  The reason for these
changes is not only increased water scarcity, but also political pressures.  These pressures can be
traced  historically  (as in  the  aforementioned  case studies)  and  can  also be  understood  in  a
fundamental sense via various political economy mechanisms.  This last section of the survey is
a logical place to end (excepting annotation of case studies).  With any change in environment,
whether it is physical in the case of increasing water scarcity or whether it is political in the case
of changing water institutions, there are groups who will be better off and those  who will be
worse off.  When examining the potential of an irrigation pricing mechanisms to better manage
existing water supplies, it is essential to evaluate these groups in order to successfully implement
the pricing policy.
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64APPENDIX  A: CASE  STUDIES
It is the intention  of this survey  to categorize  recent  case studies on irrigation  systems,  building
on the work by Dinar and Subramanian (1997).  Due to  the vast number of case studies
concerning  relevant  aspects  of irrigation,  I have kept  this summary  to a brief description:  author,
country, year, subject, etc.  The full reference for the studies will be found in the reference
section  under  the first author's last name.
65Table 2: Case Studies
Study and Country  Subject / Year  Pricing  Policy(s) I  Key Findings
Allocation Method
LDCs
De Azevedo and Asad  Political process behind  CWA  Full economic cost recovery via bulk water pricing is not
(2000) - Brazil  water pricing reform and  practical due to information costs and hence water markets may
initiation of bulk water  be more sensible.
pricing
Kemper and Olson  Institutional change in  CWA  Development projects that incorporate institutional reform (e.g.,
(2000) - Mexico and  water pricing.  water right definition and decentralized management) and
Ceara, Brazil  supply/demand side management have to increase the timeframe
for project evaluation.
Wambia (2000) - Political economy of  CWA  Evaluating reform success is difficult for policy makers as
Pakistan  water institution reform.  political parameter information is often missing.  To minimize
social implementation costs, it is necessary to choose reform
______________________  sequences correctly.
Ward (2000) - Yemen  Political economy of  CWA  Increasing irrigation water prices encourage use efficiency, but
irrigation water pricing.  have often come with political and social unrest.  The most
benign government option lies in promoting irrigation efficiency
via research, extension, and investment.
Qingtao et al. (1999) - Description of Chinese  CWA  Environmental protection measures must be taken as part of an
China  water transfer project:  irrigation system.  Inattention to these measures could lead to




Palanisami (1999) - Irrigation strategies to  CWA  To increase water-use efficiency the following short term
Tamil Nadu  meet increasing water  measures are advisable:  better management strategies with
demand.  WUAs, irrigation technology adoption, and use of waste and salt
water for irrigation. Long-term measures include identificationof appropriate investments and diversion of water from west
flowing rivers.
Johnson, Svendsen, and  System performance  Decentralize  Incentive management systems and financial autonomy for
Zhang (1998) - China  changes in response to  d CWA  public irrigation districts have led to increases in irrigation fee
organizational reform.  collection rates and more efficient multi-part fee structures.
Perry and  Fanner response to  Warabandi  Farmers aim to maximize returns to the scarce resource, but
Narayanamurthy (1998)  uncertain supplies.  guard against risk by reducing areas planted when season water
- Haryana, India  allocations are uncertain.
Wichelns (1998) - Economic issues  CWA/WUA  Public agencies have an important role in enforcing property
Egypt  regarding tertiary canal  rights and designating uses of water funds.  Cost recovery can be
improvements.  implemented in cooperation with WUAs and enhanced by
_____________________  ______________________  _________  _  _allowing  trades to occur.
Diao and Roe (1998) - Sequencing of trade and  CWA  Welfare decreasing effects of water market reform on certain
Morocco  walter m  reform:  agricultural sectors can be ameliorated by reforming trade
practices prior to tne  watter  rcff  C  .
Marre  et  al.  (1998)  - Differential charges and  WUAs  Due to low collection levels, much of WUA income is spent on
Mendoza, Argentina  participation rates  fixed costs (e.g., salaries) and little on O&M.  This causes
further dissatisfaction with paying users.
Kloezen and Garces-  Assessing irrigation  WUAs  Comparative indicators used in Mexico's  Lerna  District for
Restrepo (1998) - performance.  irrigation management show conditions of abundant water
Mexico  availability, irrigation depths that are high relative to crop
requirements, economic outputs per unit of water and land that
are favorable to other districts, full recovery of O&M, and
____________________  _____________________  overexploitation of the aquifers.
Bandaragoda (1998) - Water allocation rules.  Warabandi  Increasing inequity in water distribution indicates that the
Pakistan  balance between infrastructure, water rights, and organizational
responsibilities is failing.  Adaptability of rules to changing
conditions is therefore necessary.
Rosegrant and Perez  Water resources  CWA  Water reform is needed in Africa to meet growing demands.
(1997) - Select African  development.  The most important reforms require establishment of secure
Countries  water rights, decentralization and privatization of water
management, the use of market for trading water rights, pricing
reforms and reductions in subsidies, and pollution charges.
67Svendsen and Nott  Management transfers.  WUAs  Falling public O&M costs, rising private costs, improved cost
(1997) - Turkey  recovery, falling bureaucratic staff numbers, and improved
system performance have been linked to rapid irrigation
management decentralization in Turkey.
Brewer et al. (1997) - Water distribution rules.  WUAs  Inconsistent water rules cause operational problems that may
Tambraparani, India  lead to poor efficiency and equity in water distribution.
Therefore, water law needs to be flexible to adapt to new
problems or demand changes.
Hearne and Easter  Economic and financial  Water  Market transfer of water-use rights does produce substantial
(1997) - Chile  gains from water  Trades  economics gains-from-trade.  Lack of trading in some regions
markets.  reflects the costs of modifying fixed infrastructure to facilitate
trades.
Johnson (1997) - Decentralization o f  WUAs  WUAs have proven capable of operating and maintaining
Mexico  public irrigation.  irrigation systems in Mexico.  They have established an
investment fund to cover emergencies and future investments.  It
is necessary, however, to insure long-run sustainability of the
program to clarify water laws in order to protect agricultural
water rights.
Kloezen, Restrepo, and  Management transfers  WUAs  Comparative indicators for system performance were developed
Johnson (1997) - and performance  to assess management decentralization strategies.
Mexico  indicators.
Rinaudo et al. (1997) - Private tubewells, surface  Informal  Groundwater sales form the bulk of total irrigation water
Pakistan  water markets, and  water  transaction, although canal rights are also traded.  Water markets
inadequate canal water  market  are localized and so the spatial structure of the markets within a
supply.  trades.  watercourse command area requires further examination.
Shumba and Mposa  Performance of 6  CWA  Crop yields under small-scale farmns  are so low as to make
(1996) -Zimbabwe  smallholder Schemes  irrigation investment questionable.  Increased efficiencies can be
evaluated in yields of  achieved if farmers form coalitions.
maize and beans.
Johnson (1997) - Decentralization  of  WUAs  Efficiency increases have been realized in fee collection and
Mexico  public  irrigation  and  O&M, however more funds for future investment needs to be put
management transfers.  aside.  Water law clarifications are necessary as well.
68Plusquellec (1996) - Technology  in  small  Advanced water control technologies are appropriate for small-
Iran  farm irrigation.  scale farm projects.
Small (1996) - O&M  under  economic  Supply  Financial autonomy of irrigation systems is enhanced by supply
Vietnam  reform  Co-ops  cooperatives that act as an intermediary between farmers and the
central water authority.
Shumba and Maposa  Performance  of  small-  CWA  There are tremendous potential increases in small-scale farm
(1996) - Zimbabwe  scale irrigation schemes.  yields possible by increasing irrigation water certainty and by
fixing the road infrastructure.
Rosegrant and Schleyer  Mexican  water  law  Water  Tradable water rights raised cost of supplying water via
(1996) -Mexico  reform  Trading  inflexible conv;eyance  system.
Bilen (1995) - Turkey  Water  management  plan  CWA  Inter-sectoral planning of several aspects of water resource
for a basin  should be  fit  management can augment system efficiency. Recommends a
into  national  plans  and  movement from project-oriented water resource planning toward
policies,  broader national perspectives.
Marikar, Wilkin-Wells,  Measures to evaluate  WUAs  Using performance  iieasuircs  adapted from  Thiel's  mean-square
Smolnik and Sampath  system performance and  forecast error concept, it was shown that fertilizer, labor and
(1992) - Sri Lanka  crop productivity.  concentration of power positively affects yields, while poor
________  _______  management adversely affects yields.
Sampath (1991) - India  Evaluation of irrigation  CWA  There is considerable inequality in irrigation distribution in
distribution and equity in  India's states.  Changing the current policy to a Rawlsian
India's  states.  distribution policy would reduce this inequity in general and
specifically in the canal irrigation areas.
Seckler, Sampath and  Measuring the  Warabandi  Farmers irrigate the designed amount of land, but show
Raheja (1988) - India  performance of irrigation  System  significant inter-farm irrigation levels.  The operating efficiency
management systems.  of this system was found to be 80%.
Dhawan (1988) - India  Productivity, stability,  CWA  Factors such as credit availability for the purchase of fertilizer at
and equity in India's  low rates of interest adversely affect the chances of small
agricultural development.  farmers in India to fully realize benefits of irrigation.  This
compounds inequality problems inherent in this system.  Land
redistribution is cited as one possible solution.
69Martin and Yoder  Institutional structures /  WUAs  Water allocation by purchasing shares in a continuous flow
(1987) - Nepal  1982 - 1983.  rotation provides efficient development of resources, while
proportional irrigated area allocation does not.
Merrey and Wolf  O&M Finance / 1983 - Irrigation planners must focus on the development of appropriate
(1986) - Pakistan  1984.  organizational capacities so that users can best make use of the
system.
MDCs
Musgrave (2000) - Political economy of  CWA  Decentralization and water price reforms are advanced in the
Australia  water price reform.  urban sector, but there are many groups opposed to reform in the
rural agricultural sector.
Pigram (1999) - Applicability of
Australia  Australian water reforms
to general conditions.
Bjornlund and McKay  Impact of Trade (water  Tradable Water Entitlements (TWE) are a tool to alleviate the
(1999) - Victoria,  markets) on socially  influence of raising water prices and to facilitate a re-allocation
Australia  equitable water  of water resources to more efficient and sustainable uses from an
allocation.  economic, social and environmental perspective. Within the
present legislative framework this does however not always
direct water to the most sustainable users in an equitable manner.
Varela-Ortega  et  al.  Farmer response to  CWA  Policies are strongly dependent on the distinct regional
(1998) - Spain  alternative water pricing  institutions.  Equivalent water charges would then create
policies.  widespread effects on water savings, farn  income, and
government collections across regions.
Willis et al.  (1998) - Effects of water rights  CWA I  Contract costs are lower under an excess stored water contract
Snake River Basin  and irrigation technology  Water Bank  than a total stored water contract, however there is less water for
on streamflow  environmental protection.
augmentation
Ise and Sunding (1997)  Trades to the  Water  Personal characteristics such as short-term financial constraints,
-Nevada  environment.  Markets  significantly affect trading decisions.  This suggests that
environmental agencies may wish to target marginal farners  to
attain more efficient outcomes.
70MacDonnell et al.  . Kern Water Bank,  Water  A comprehensive guide to issues surrounding the development
(1994) - American  CA  Banks  of and movement towards water banking in the American West.
West  *  Arvin Edison / Metro,  These allow greater flexibility in marketing of water and reduce
LA  transactions costs.
*  Orange County, CA




Chang and Griffen  Water markets as a  Water  For transactions involving representative cities, the estimated
(1992) - Texas  means to reallocate  Markets  benefits from water marketing far exceed the agricultural cost of
water.  the transfer.
Cummings and  Water pricing to enhance  Water  The equity concerns related to third parties and water markets
N ercissianiz  1978097)  - c;ficincy=  in iritinn  Markets  have been addressed in the western U.S., which may be
U.S. and Mexico  j  j  applicable  to recent Mexican  reforms.
Reviews  Included Studies/Countries  Subject  Key Findings
Dinar (2000)  *  Musgrave (2000) - Australia  Political economy of water  Documents key reform efforts
*  De Azevedo and Asad (2000) - Brazil  pricing reforrn.  in these countries, noting the
. Wambia (2000) - Pakistan  effects of political economies
*  Kemper and Olson (2000) - Mexico  on success or failure.
and Brazil
*  Ward (2000) - Yemen  ___
Saleth and Dinar (1999)  *  Australia  Evaluation of water  With an overall pro-reform
World Bank  *  Brazil  institutions and water sector  climate, it is possible to
*  Chile  performance.  minimize transaction costs and
*  India  achieve more than
*  Israel  proportionate improvement in
. Mexico  water sector performance.
71*  S. Africa  Results indicate that a
*  Spain  sequential strategy for
*  Sri Lanka  institutional reform in general
*  USA  and water institutions in
particular.
Marino and Kemper  *  Brazil  Institutional frameworks in  When theoretical models for
(1999)  *  Spain  successful water markets.  water markets are being
World Bank  *  Colorado  derived from industrialized
countries for application to
LDCs, it is essential to review
the institutional frameworks
that have contributed to
successful water markets.
International Water  *  Matsuno (1999) - Sri Lanka  Nonagricultural uses of  Due to increasing water
Management Institute  *  Scott, Zarazua, and Levine (1999) - irrigation water.  scarcity, nonagricultural uses
(1999)  Mexico  of irrigation water have
*  Jensen (1999) - Pakistan  significant environmental,
health, and other domestic
consequences that need to be
examined.
Easter et al. (1998)  *  Griffin (1998) - Texas  Water Markets  Water markets have worked
Kluwer Academic  *  Howe (1998) - Colorado  and can be used efficiently to
Publishers  *  Colby (1998) - U.S. West  allocate water.  Where water is
*  Howitt (1998) - California  scarce and large amounts of
*  Hearne (1998) - Chile  available water have already
*  Hearne and Easter (1998) - Chile  been committed to users, the
*  Hearne (1998) - Mexico  economic benefits from water
*  Sealet  (1  998)-  Mexico  markets are likely to be the
*  Salethi(1998)  - n  a  largest.  For these markets to
*  Meinzen-Dick  (1998)  - Pa  istan  be effective, it is necessary to
*  Garrido (1998) - Spain  keep transaction costs low and
*  Horbulyk and Lo (1998) - Canada  to develop appropriate
institutional and organizational
72arrangements.
Dinar and Subranian  *  Salem (197) - Algeria  Pricing Policies  Most countries surveyed are
(1997) World Bank  *  Musgrave (1997) - Australia  decentralizing water
*  Thema (1997) - Botswana  management.  Some are
*  de Azevedo (1997) - Brazil  developing legal frameworks
*  Horbulyk (1997) - Canada  to decentralize and to
*  Montginoul (1997) - France  encourage private investment
*  Saleth (1997) - India  through incentives.  Many
*  Yaron (1997) - Israel  countries are implementing
*  Destro  (I997) - Italy  prices to recover a portion of
*  Rabemanar bola (I997) - Madagascar  O&M costs from users.  This
entails a movement away from
*  Heyns (1997) -Namibia  uniform tariffs and minimum
*  Scrimgeour (1997) - New Zealand  prices towards higher
*  Mohtadullah (1997) - Pakistan  -ol  tric prices  The
*  Maestu (1997) - Spain  development of transferable
*  Adam (1997) - Sudan  water rights and water markets
. Hsiao and Luo (1997) - China  is crucial to consider for future
*  Mujwahuzi (1997) - Tanzania  water management.
*  Slim et al. (1997) - Tunisia
*  Onek (1997) - Uganda
*  Rees (1997) - United Kingdom
*  Wahl (1997)  - United States
Vermillion (1997)  *  Oorthuizen and Kloezen (1995) - Decentralization and  The impacts of management
IIMI  Philippines  Management Transfer  transfer are for the most part
*  Wijayarantna and Vermillion (1994) - positive.  These include
Philippines  reduction in the cost of
*  Badadion (1994) - Philippines  irrigation to farmers and
*  Svendsen (1992) - Philippines  government, enhanced self-
*  Johnson and Reiss (1993) - Indonesia  reliance of irrigation schemes,
*  Nguyen and Luong (1994) - Vietnam  expansion of service areas,
*  Johnson et al. (1995) - China  reduction in the amount of
water delivered on a per
73*  IIMI and BAU (1996) - Bangladesh  hectare basis, and increases in
*  Rana et al. (1994) - Nepal  cropping yields.  Negative
. Olin (1994) - Nepal  impacts reported include
*  Mishra and Molden (1996) - Nepal  increased costs of irrigation
*  Kloezen (1996) - Sri Lanka  services, failing financial
*  Uphoff (1992) - Sri Lanka  viability, and deteriorating
*  Pant (1994) - India  infrastructure.
*  Srivastava and Brewer (1994) - India
*  Rao (1994) - India
*  Shah et al. (1994) - India
*  Kalro and Naik (1995) - India
*  Azziz (1994) - Egypt
*  Samad and Dingle (1995) - Sudan
*  DSI, EDI, and IIMI (1996) - Turkey
*  Maurya and Musa (1993, 1994) -
Nigeria
*  Wester et al. (1995) - Senegal
*  Yap-Salinas (1994)-  Dominican
Republic
*  Vermillion and Garces-Restrepo
(1996) - Colombia
*  Garces-Restrepo and Vermillion
(1994)  - Colombia
*  Johnson (1996) - Mexico
*  Svednsen and Vermillion (1994) -
Washington State, USA
. Farley (1994) - New Zealand
Merrey (1997) - *  Indonesia  O&M Design of Irrigation  Documents using case studies
Summary of IIMI  *  Pakistan  Systems, Irrigation  the actual performance of
R&D:  1984-1995  *  Sudan  Management Transfers,  irrigation systems and potential
*  West Africa  Health and Environmental  efficiency gains.  Documents
. Malaysia  Aspects of Irrigation  the high degree of unreliability
74*  Bihar, India  Systems, Institutional  and inequity of surface water
*  Gujarat, India  Capacity Building,.  deliveries and its relationship
*  Sri Lanka  to salinity.  IIMIs research
*  Egypt  illustrates that negative trends
*  USA  in irrigation, such as soil
*  Colombia  degradation and erosion, are
*  Niger  due primarily to institutional
*  Nigeria  and political concerns.
.. Niger  Financial viability of LDC
*  China  irrigation systems is
NeChnal  questionable and is also linked
. Nepal  to institutional and political
concerns.  WUAs have poor
organization and political
enforceable water rights, and
therefore suffer from
inefficiencies.  Increasing
water competition from other
sectors is leading to a decline
in importance of irrigation
agencies.
Johnson (1997) - Irrigation management transfers and  CWA/WUA  To insure the stability of
Mexico Districts  decentralization in Mexican irrigation.  WUAs and the sustainable
IIMI  management of Mexican
irrigation, it will be necessary
to establish an investment fund
and to clarify water laws to
protect agricultural rights.
Parker and Tsur (1997)  *  Yaron (1997) - Israel  Decentralization and  As water becomes scarcer it
Kluwer Academic  *  Kindler (1997) - Jordan River Basin  Coordination  becomes more expensive via
Publishers  *  Cakmak (1997) - Turkey  increasing scarcity prices.
*  Parker (1997) - California  Hence, misuse is becoming
75*  Boggess (1997) - Florida  more costly and the need for
*  Pigram (1997) - Australia  more efficient use management
. Just, Netanyahu, and Horowitz (1997)  has increased.  As a result
- Israel and Jordan  there has been a global
*  Zusman (1997) - Israel  movement away from
*  Becker, Zeitouni, and Shechter (1997)  centralized water management
- Middle East  towards decentralized
*  Tsur (1997) - California  mechanisms to increase
*  Just, Horowitz, and Netanyahu (1997)  distributional efficiency.
- Jordan-Yarmouk River Basin
*  Sunding, Zilberman, MacDougall,
Howitt, and Dinar (1997) - California
Bay/Delta
. Gleick (1997) - Middle East and
California
*  Musgrave (1997) - Australia
Miranda  (1989)  *  Indonesia  Irrigation Management for
IIMI  . Philippines  Crop Diversification
*  Sri Lanka
Rydzewski and Ward  *  Sampath (1989) - India  Performance Evaluation of  Text Book.
(1989)  . Ramnamurthy  (1989) - S. India  Existing Irrigation Projects.
Institute of Irrigation  *  Farbrother (1989) - Sudan
Studies  *  Smith and Carruthers (1989) - Inus
Valley
*  Chohan (1989) - Pakistan
*  Bybordi (1989) - Iran
*  Zhaoyi (1989) - China
*  Biswas (1989) - Sri Lanka
*  Tekinel et al. (1989) - Turkey
*  Satyanarayana et al. (1989) - India
*  Portch et al. (1989) - Sub-Saharan
Africa
76*  Stoutjesdijk (1989) - Southern Africa
*  McAnderson et al. (1989) - Ethiopia
*  Hewett et al. (1989) - Sudan
*  Van Bentam and Smout (1989) -
Bhutan
Easter (1987)  *  Philippines  Inadequate management and  Pricing policies in many Asian
University of  *  Maharashtra, India  declining infrastructure.  countries and/or the ability to
Minnesota / USAID  *  Nepal  collect fees is inadequate.
*  SriLanka  There are 4 conditions
necessary for increased




rea;;uuation  of:uncr,c  a  s.ed
collections to infrastructure
improvement.
77APPENDIX B:  METHODOLOGIES AND DATABASES
Methodologies
There are several good sources describing generalized methodologies for estimating crop-water
response  functions  (Heady  and  Hexem,  1978;  Vaux  and  Pruitt,  1983;  Letey,  Knapp  and
Solomon, 1990; and Liewelyn and Fetherstone,  1997).  These address economic, engineering,
and  biological aspects of  the production process.  They conclude that  crop-water production
relationships are very complicated and must  include various management issues to adequately
cater  to  specific  situations.  Consequently,  these  methodologies  have  been  developed  to
incorporate salinity (Feinerman et al., 1984; Plessner and Feinerman, 1995; Kirda et al.,  1999)
and  evapotranspiration 30 (Letey,  Dinar,  and  Knapp,  1985), and  deficit irrigation  (Small  and
Rimal,  1996; Kirda, et al., 1999).  Empirical verifications of this theory for several crops can be
found in  Letey and  Dinar (1986) and  Kirda et  al. (1999)3'.  The use  of production  function
technology to reduce drainage and salinity problems are developed in Dinar et al. (1989); Letey,
Knapp, and Solomon (1990); Knapp et al, (1990); and Dinar and Letey (1996).  Intertemporal
aspects of crop-water production  functions have been developed  in  Plessner  and  Feinerman
(1995), Scheierling et al. (1997), and Kirda et al. (1999).
Comparative analysis  of  crop  water  requirements  conducted  for  Zimbabwe,  Egypt,  Turkey,
Scotland, Tamil Nadu,  Indonesia, and  New  Zealand can  be  found in  Rydzewski  and  Ward
(1989).  Perry and Narayanamurthy (1998) review theoretical responses of farmers to uncertain
irrigation supplies and  provide an  empirical  illustration  for warabandi  irrigation in  Haryana
State, India.
Programs to Calculate Crop-water Requirements" 2
o  FA  Methodologies (see http://fao.org, 1999)
Since  the  early  1970's  FAO  has  been  using  CROPWAT 33 for  calculating  crop  water
requirements. This has been a widely accepted standard for irrigation studies over the past
two decades.  CROPWAT is intended as a practical tool for practitioners when calculating
standard  evapotranspiration  and  crop  water  uses.  It  is  adapted  for  development  or
improvement  of the  management  and  design  of  irrigation  schemes  under  varying  water
conditions: rainfed or deficit irrigation. CROPWAT calculations of crop water requirements
utilize the CLIMWAT climatic and crop data (see below).
30 Evapotranspiration is the amount of water actually used by the soil-plant system.
31 Included in Kirda et al, (1999) are response functions for a variety of crops:  cotton, maize, soybean, sugar beet,
sunflower, wheat, winter wheat, common bean, groundnuts, sugarcane, and irish potato.
32 A review of the evapotranspiration equations used in most computable crop-water programs recently appeared in
Irrigation Science (Ventura et al., 1999).
33 CROPWAT version 5.7 issued in 1992 is freely available from the FAO web site in English, French, and Spanish.
It can also be found as a publication (FAO:  Drainage and Irrigation Paper No. 46, 1992.  Included is a manual and
guidelines).
78In  1990  a  panel  of  experts  recommended  the  adoption  of  the  Penman-Monteith
methodology 34 for evapotranspiration and parameter calculations necessary to determine crop
water  requirements  around  the  g lobe.  The  FAO  minutes  from  their  discussion  of
methodology and current revisions cm be found in Smith (1999)35.
*  ILRI Methodology
Another  program  for  calculating  crop  irrigation  requirements  in  CRIWAR,  which  was
developed jointly  between the Wageningen University of Agriculture  (WUA), the Winand
Staring Centre  for  Integrated Research  on  Rural  Areas  SC-DLO),  and  the  International
Institute  for  Land  Reclamation  and  Improvement  (ILRI).  A  copy  of  this  program  and
operating manual  can be  found in  the public  domain  (ILRI  Publication 46).  CRIWAR
calculates  the irrigation  water requirements of  cropping patterns  in  an  irrigated area  for
various  stages during  the growing  :season.  The irrigated water requirement  is simply the
difference  between  the  potential  evapotranspiration  and  the  effective  precipitation.
Evapotranspiration values can be calculated using either the modified Penman Method or the
Penman-Monteith Method.  The effective precipitation values are estimated using the method
developed by the U.S. Soil Conservation Service.
*  Other Commonly Encountered Programs
There  are  many  modeling  prograrms available  that  predict  evapotranspiration  and  crop
responses  to  water  availability,  i ncluding  irrigation  water.  Some  of  these  include:
GLEAMS, Opus, PRZM-2, RZMWQM, PRMS, EPIC, SIRS (rice) and CERES (maize). It is
obviously  beyond  the  scope of  thi:s work to  review the  literature  surrounding the  many
simulation programs available.  Several recent sources comparing the accuracy of forecasts
for various crop conditions are:  Small and Rimal (1996), Llewelyn and Featherstone (1997),
Evers et al. (1998), and Ma et al. (1999). Dinar and Letey (1996) draw a distinction between
holistic and specific simulation models.  Holistic models simulate the production process of
only one crop in a detailed manner, including several state and decision variables.  Examples
include COTMOD, GOSSYM, ARID CROP, and EPIC.  Specific models focus on a single
production input, such as yield responses to changes in soil moisture.  Examples for soil
moisture and salinity can be found in Yaron et al. (1972) and in Dinar and Letey (1996).
Databases
*  The  FAO  maintains  and  extensive  climate  database,  which  includes  standard  crop
information plus daily soil and water balances for 144 countries (CLIMWAT).  This data
can be accessed via the internet  (as above) or as a publication  (FAO:  Irrigation  and
Drainage Paper No.  49,1993).
*  There are several downloadable USDA databases available on the internet via Cornell
University (see http://www.usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/).  These include:
34 FAO current guidelines  for calculating  crop water requirements  can be found in FAO: Irrigation  and Drainage
Paper  No. 56 (1998).
35 See  http://www.fao.org/WAICENT/FAOINFCO/AGRICULT/AGL/aglw/Wcrop.html).
79(1)  Bureau of Reclamation Data - Agricultural Water Use [ERS]
Contains data on agricultural use of federally supplied irrigation water for bureau of
reclamation  lands receiving  full and supplemental  water service. This includes  net water
supply,  water deliveries,  and acres  irrigated  by drip, sprinkler,  and gravity systems.
(2)  Farm and Ranch Irrigation [ERS]
This  includes the  data from the  1984 Farm and Ranch Irrigation Survey, which
supplements  the basic irrigation  data collected  from all farm  operators  in the 1982  Census
of Agriculture. The methodology  is similar to those used in the 1979 Farm and Ranch
Irrigation  Survey.
(3)  Irrigation Production Data System [ERS]
(4)  World Food Aid Needs and Availability [ERS]
This is a full-text  report that studies the world food aid needs, defined as the amount of
grain  needed  to fill the gap between  what a country  can produce  and its financial  capacity
to import,  and a targeted consumption  level including  emergency  needs. This factors in
such a comprehensive  set of considerations  that include: supply and demand,  prices and
trade, food production, yields, fertilizer use, land constraints, water and  irrigation,
population growth, food consumption and nutrition, domestic policies and  foreign
exchange  availabilities.
Through the  International Food  Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and  associate
organizations  several irrigation resources can be accessed (see http://www.cgiar.org/).
These include:
(1)  IMPACT
This is a multi-sector  model to examine global food security. One of the parameters  is
irrigation  water supply  and investment.
(2)  IIMI Spreadsheet:  World Water and Climate Atlas
This is a simulation  model  to simulate  water supply  and demand for major countries  (by
sector)  in the world between 1990  and 2025.
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